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Abstract
Throughout the financial crisis central banks experienced a situation where standard monetary measures
failed to create stability and restore growth to the financial markets and the overall economy. Therefore
new response methods where introduced. One of the key responses was to extend longer maturity loans
through auctions supported by a wider range of collateral (The Term Auction Facility or TAF program).
In the aftermath of the crisis in financial markets the effect of this monetary measure has been widely
discussed. A key topic of interest is how it affected the term structure of interbank interest rates and
whether it restored access to liquidity for financial institutions.
In this thesis we develop and apply three statistical tests to study if the TAF had the intended effect on
US interbank rates, and whether or not spillover effects to other markets have been seen as well. First
we compute the frequency of a directional move following term auctions, and compare this with the
frequency in the overall financial crisis. Then we compute the expected size in such a move following
auction dates, and compare expected sizes in such moves during the rest of the financial crisis. Third
we use an event study to look for abnormal movements following auction dates. Here we estimate an
affine term structure model driven by a vector autoregressive model with the credit premium, liquidity
premium and short rate as driving factors in an affine term structure model.
The thesis has four major findings;
First, we find that the probability of drops in interbank interest rates and spreads tended to be more likely
and larger in size following the notification of information regarding the results of TAF-auctions.
Second, the Term Auction Facility caused international spillover effects which varied from market to
market. Specifically we found that unsecured loans with more than 5 months to maturity became less
expensive compared to unsecured loans with less than 5 months to maturity. These results were found
in the UK and EU, and were highly significant. The same results indicate that interest rate levels tended
to fall, but these results were not significant.
Third, interest rates on loans with more than 4 months to maturity dropped more than what could be
expected, even when credit and liquidity factors could be perfectly predicted. This suggests that the
results from TAF-auctions went a long way in reducing premiums on unsecured loans in the interbank
marked with longer maturities (5-12 months).
Last, the Term Auction Facility seem to have pulled down premiums on credit and liquidity beyond what
could be expected following the notification of results from the TAF auctions. These effects were seen
to spill over to the settlement day as well.
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Chapter
Introduction and Background
1.1 Introduction
The roles of modern central banks are monetary policy and support for financial stability. The last was a
function which was prominent under the recent financial turmoil, with substantial need for intervention
and extraordinary measures (Martnez, 2009).
Even though key policy rates were cut to almost zero during the financial turmoil, the liquidity squeeze
remained. The failed transmission mechanisms of monetary management using standing facilities forced
central banks to introduce non-standard or extraordinary measures to address the ultimate goal, financial
and macroeconomic stability in the economy. Many new measures were put into place, among these the
Term Auction Facility (TAF)(FED, 2009).
Through the TAF, between USD3Obn and USD141bn were lent from the central bank to financial in-
stitutions bi-weekly in an attempt to provide liquidity to institutions which suddenly had a hard time
getting access to sufficient liquidity. In contrast to similar standing facilities the TAF program avoided
creating stigma effects by keeping participants anonymous: . The interconnectedness2 of banks suggests
that such a large non standard measure could have effect across the global money market. The facility
remained in place throughout the crisis until demand vanished in the beginning of 2010.
Policy rate changes are normally followed by liquidity measures to back up the "new" poalicy rate,
ensuring that LOIS spreads do not increase. It is therefore natural to expect TAF auctions to have
a similar effect. Each TAF auction increases monetary base (total available liquidity in the market)
hopefully causing reduced pressure on money market rates and reduced LOIS-spreads.
A wide range of research is already conducted through various approaches in an attempt to answer the
question "Was there an effect?" (Taylor and Williams (2008a), Taylor and Williams (2008b), McAndrews,
Sarkar, and Wang (2008), Ait-Sahalia, Andritzky, Jobst, Nowak, and Tamirisa (2012)). Conclusions
vary with methodologies, approaches and choices of variables. In any case none of these papers seeks
to answer the questions given that there was an effect, "How did the TAF impact Money Market
For more information about the TAF program see section 1.2.3.
2(May, Levin, & Sugihara, 2008).
4
Spreads?"
This thesis shed light on whether the TAF program had the intended effect, pulling down money market
premiums. Three parts of a possible effect is studied; "Was the probability of movements in any part
of the term structure impacted?", "Was expected movements in these parts larger than what was else
observed in the crisis?", and, "When did impacts occur, and how did the translate into term structure
moves?".
To study these questions three tests are performed; the frequency of directional moves is computed, then
the expected size of these moves, both for days with TAF operations and for the rest of the financial
crisis. The frequencies and expected sizes are then compared to see whether there exist any effects on
TAF operation dates different from other days during the crisis. Finally an event study is performed
in an attempt to locate the source of any such abnormal movements following TAF operation days.
Different from present day prevailing research an affine term structure model is motivated and used as
the normal movement scenario. This model is driven by a vector autoregressive stochastic process with
credit premium, liquidity premium and short rate as driving factors.
Firstly of all, the research seem to uncover the possibility of the presence of an impact from the TAF.
This is most apparent in the event study, where a pattern of significant abnormal movement is detected
on the day when information concerning results from the auctions is released and on the following
day. Secondly, the first and second test indicates impact especially on the slope of the term structure,
in particular for the short end. This follows from both a higher probability of movement and a larger
expected size in movement on dates surrounding the auction. Lastly the first and second test insinuate
effects on international interbank spreads. These effects do primarily occur through a flattening of the
term structure in particular for the short maturity part.
The remainder of this paper is as follows: In the rest of this chapter a detailed background for the
overall situation is presented, as well as previous research and literature related to our research questions.
In Chapter 2 the methodology and variables used are motivated. In Chapter 3 empirical evidence is
presented and discussed, as well as potential paths for future research.
1.2 Motivating the Study of Interbank OIS Spread Term Structures
This section provides an overview of the progression of events during the financial crisis as well as
the measures taken by central banks during this period. The key connections between interbank rates,
Overnight Indexed Swap (OIS) rates and the TAF are made, and a detailed overview of the term auction
facility is provided. A key focus is the role of the Term Auction Facility (TAF) as one of the largest
and most important measures implemented during the crisis by the Federal Reserve (FED) in the US to
stabilize financial markets, and especially interbank markets.
1.2.1 The Financial Crisis
Starting August 9th 2007, money market spreads experiences an unprecedented jump following BNP
halting redemption on three of their funds. Combined with reports of decreased levels of issuance in
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asset backed commercial paper markets, this represents the first indication of the build-up of global
financial crisis. A crisis that turned out to be one of the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression,
- the decade preceding world war II.
Before the financial crisis struck the world economy, the United States experienced one of the longest
lasting bull markets3 in history. This situation was in large part fueled by low interest rates due to
large capital inflow from Asian countries, and the adoption of a lax interest rate policy (Hemmelgarn &
Nicodeme, 2010).
The Federal Reserve avoided to counteract the build-up of a housing bubble as they still feared a de-
flationary period after the Internet Bubble, which ravaged the US between 1997 and 2000 climaxing
10th March 2000 (Brunnermeier, 2008). The banking system went from what Brunnermeier called the
traditional banking model, to the originate and distribute banking model (Brunnermeier, 2008).
This new development led banks to pool and sell mortgages to investment banks, who then sliced and
re-pooled them before reselling them as collateralized debt obligation (hereafter, CDO) tranches to in-
vestors. As residential housing prices had been booming for what seemed to be decades, financial
markets assessed these securities to be as safe as government debt. They later turned out to be "the bull
that broke the banks back", bringing cascading effects through the entire banking system (May et al.,
2008).
During spring 2007, walkouts4 became the start of the financial crisis. As American borrowers struggled
to keep up with their growing (and sometimes jumping) interest rate and principal payments, combined
with dropping house prices and excess supply of houses, it created a negative spiral causing even more
walkouts. As a result, banks and CDO investors become property owners rather than cash flow owners,
forcing them to take losses.
Over the summer 2007, the US sub-prime 5 crisis spread to a number of advanced economies in the
world. These countries were often exposed directly through a combination of sub-prime assets, loss of
confidence to a variety of asset classes and non-functional dry financial markets. These factors provoked
severe disruptions in funding sources and asset bubbles (Nier & Merrouche, 2010).
As more and more sub-prime loans began to decay, mortgage backed notes became worthless. Many
international banks held worthless bonds and had to take write-downs. In the absence of any records
on which banks held such bonds, the financial market became sceptical of whom they could safely
lend money to. The fear of a borrower's creditworthiness and lenders capacity and willingness to lend,
resulted in unpredicted jump in unsecured money market spreads. (Abbassi & Linzert, 2011). Banks
would rather keep their excess cash than lend it to a counterpart in risk of default, a situation referred
to as precautionary hoarding (Brunnermeier, 2008). These conditions drove spreads further up, causing
more expensive borrowing, tighter credit supply, more strict credit standards and in the end exploded
3A Boll market is characterized by a group of securities that are rising or expected to rise. The opposite is called bear
market.
4 In the US mortgages are written on the property itself, not the purchaser of the property. If the persons residing on that
property are unable to pay their liabilities, they can walk away from the property without the risk of prosecution, hence the
term "walkout". The property then belongs to the owner of the liabilities, often the bank.
5Subprime: Borrowers whose credit has been impaired, in some cases due to life events such as unemployment or illness.
At the same time, these borrowers have sufficientequity in their homes to mitigate the lender's exposure, thereby allowing the
lender to place lesser weight on the credit profile. (Fabozzi, 2005).
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into a credit crisis for both business and household segments.
A combination of lower growth and many financial institutions on the verge of bankruptcy forced gov-
ernments around the world to intervene in order to stirnulate the economies and prevent a global reces-
sion.
Among other governmental measures the reserve supply (liquidity) to banks was an important instrument
from the central banks. In many countries this implied a changing systems for managing bank reserves.
This became a global approach that central banks around the world adopted to stimulate and help banks
and financial institutions through the liquidity crisis.
1.2.2 Crisis - related Monetary Policy Measures
By January 2013, central banks around the world have massively expanded their balance sheets. This
was the result when Taylor's rules6 for monetary management failed to stimulate growth (e.g. short term
interest rates close to zero without effect) (Martin & Milas, 2012). During such a long and deep crisis
as the recent one, it became necessary to enact "non-standard" or "unconventional" monetary policy
measures in order to stimulate growth. Taylor's theory provides no clear definition of what constitutes
non-standard monetary policy measures. We therefore classify them as extraordinary actions taken and
implemented by central banks in connection to a financial crisis, such as the recent on. These actions are
supposed to be terminated when the crisis is determined to be "over". In the case of the recent financial
crisis this involves mainly non-standard measures that goes beyond the standing facilities.
Largely monetary management from central banks during the financial turmoil can be categorized into
five main measures:
Reduced key policy rates to historically low levels and communicated that they would keep it low
for a long time.
Intervention into wide segments of the financial market.
Purchase of long term government bonds. This was part of the "Quantitative Easing" (QE) where
the goal was to lower the interest rate on medium and long term non-defaultable government
bonds by selling short and purchasing long.
Support for specific important institutions.
Expanded liquidity provisions to financial institutions. This involved relaxing collateral on liq-
uidity offers, opening central bank facilities to more institutions, providing liquidity in foreign
currency and finally providing longer-term liquidity which in the US was done through the TAF
program.
The different non-standard measures taken by the FED in response to the financial crisis can be summa-

rized in the timeline below (figure 1.1). We note that the TAF program was early adopted and one of the
6 Tay1orsrule is a monetary policy rule introduced by John Taylor in 1993. The rules are guidelines for interest rate
manipulation to stabilize the economy in the short term and on the same time maintain long-term growth. The rule implies
interest increase when inflation is below target or actual employment is below the full employment level, and the opposite
when the contrary is the case.
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measures FED kept on providing for a very long time.
11.03.2008
Term Securities
Lending Facility (TSLF)
212 12 2107 5.11.2008
 25.11.2008
Asset Purchase Program 03.11.2010
Agencies og MBS Asset Purchase Program
Treasuries (QE2)
10.08.2010
Reinvestment Agencies
and Agency MBS into Treasuries
20.06.2012
Maturity Extension Program 2
(Operation Twist)
13.09.2012
21.09.2011 NA55et Purchase Program
Maturity Extension Program 1 MBS (QE3)
(Operation Twist)
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Central Bank
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Reinvest Agencies and Agency MBS into Agency MBS
19.09.2008
ABCP Money Market
Fund Liquidity Facility (AMLF)
Figure 1.1: Federal Reserve (FED) crisis related measures
Italic indicates liquidity tnonetary measure, Red colour indicates TAF relevant dates.
1.2.3 Term Auction Facility
The Term Auction Facility (TAF) was initiated by the FED at the end of 2007 to address the elevated
pressure in short-term funding markets and was one of the first non-standard monetary measures taken
as a response to the crisis. Appendix 4.4 shows in detail the different TAF-auctionswith key data.
The TAFprogram aimed to provide capital for financial and depository institutions at a longer duration
(28 days, later increased the longest maturity to 85 days). It was initially communicated that the program
would last as long as necessary.
Any depository institutions in generally sound financial condition and certified to borrow under the pri-
mary credit discount windows could participate. A key advantage of the TAF program was the removal
of any stigma effects associated with borrowing under the primary credit discount window. As Bernanke
described in a speech held on April 2009 illustrating the stigma effect FED attempted to resolve through
its initiated measures; "In August 2007, (...) banks were reluctant to rely on discount window credit
to address their funding needs. The banks concern was that their recourse to the discount window, if
it became known, might lead market participants to infer weakness - the so-called stigma problem."
(Bernanke, 2009).
In order to create a theory on the effects of the TAF we need to review in some detail the execution of the
program. The program and auction process is described in figure 1.2. Note in particular that no results
are publicized before the notification date.
At the end of June 2009 Federal Reserve announced that a range of modifications would be made to the
Term Asset-Backed Securities
Loan Facility (TALF)
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Term Auction Facilit TAF - Process
Day 0* Day (+0)* Day 1 (+1)* Day 3 (+3)*
Notification
Date
Settlement
Date
PressRelease F Auction Date
4
- Press release by
Federal Reserve
(FED)with
information
concerning the
Offered Amount
Auctioned, Bid
submission date
notification data,
Settlement date, Bid
data and
information such as
how and who that is
enable to submit
bicis.

- Each Participant
who wishes to place
a bid can only
submit two bids to
its Local Reserve
bank.
- After Closing Time,
FEDallocate using
single-price format.
The lowest
accepted bid equals
the "stop rate", and
all bids above will
be allocated the
amount asked.
- Between 10:00 am
and 11:30 ESTon
Notification Date,
winning bid
institutions was
contacted by
Reserve Banks.
- The Board of
Governors of the
FEDSystem
published summary
of the auction
around 10:00 am on
the Notification
Date.
Awarded loans are
settled with the
maturity given in
the terms of the
current TAF.
	il
Figure 1.2: The figure above shows the usual path of any Term Auction held from December 2007 until
March 2010, with some information related to each event.
* Days are valuable for all TAF dates except the first 6. Hence, as ofTAF Auction number 7 (10th March
2008) of a total of 60 TAF Auctions, the days between are correct.
credit and liquidity programs at that time active. One of the modification was to reduce the amount of
funds available in the TAF auctions from $150Bn to $125Bn per auction, as the amounts of bids had
fallen short of the auctioned amounts. If conditions in funding markets were to improve in the future
coming months, the board would further reduce the funds available. The program was terminated March
11 2010 (FED, 2009).
1.2.4 Interbank Interest Rates
The interbank interest rate is an indication of the average rate a participating institution can obtain for
unsecured funding for a given maturity in the local currency. Different interbank rates are calculated
through different procedures, described below.
The US, the EU and the UK have their own money market, consequently banks trade in their local
currency, and hence these interest rates are not in the same manner affected by the US dollar as NIBOR,
which is closely linked to US dollars (Bergman, Juel and Steigum 2009). The most important money
market rates are respectively for these countries USD LIBOR, EURIBOR (The EU) and GBP LIBOR,
which all are quoted as the average interest rate of the selected banks. The regulatory authorities (e.g.
British Bankers Association with assistance from Foreign exchange and Market Committee for LIBOR
rates) regulate in all countries the panel banks that are included in the interbank rates.
Unlike the other countries in this analysis Norway does not have enough transaction volume to have
their own interbank market in NOK. Therefore the Norwegian banks trade with each other through
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the Eurokrone-market in USD, where the most important interest rate is Norwegian Interbank Offered
Rate (NIBOR). However not all banks have access to the USD market and as a result these are only
active in the Norwegian interbank market. Larger banks are normally active in both. As a result the
direct NOK interbank rate must be close to the implied NOK interest rate through the USD market
because participants would borrow where they get the cheapest funding, meaning that in equilibrium
these interest rates are equal and one could say that the NIBOR rate represent the NOK-USD swap rate
(Akram & Christophersen, 2010).
EURIBOR-rates
Every panel bank report to Thomson Reuters before 10.45 am CET, then the highest and lowest 15 %
are eliminated and the average of the remaining 70 % of banks represent the EURIBOR rate. Eurobor
rates are calculated the same way as the regular LIBOR rates (see below).
GBP/USDLIBOR-rates
Panel banks inform Thomson Reuters around 11 am CET, then the highest and lowest 25 % values is
eliminated and the average of the remaining 50 % represents the official LIBOR rate. LIBOR rates are
calculated on the basis of actual days funding period/360, except for GBP LIBOR which is divided by
365 (BBA, 2013).
Interest Due = Principal Sumx 

BBA LIBOR Rate Number of days in interest period
 100
360
( .1)
It is important to note that USD LIBOR and EURIBOR was reported to be exposed to manipulation
between January and July 2008 (FSA, 2012).
NIBOR-rates
NIBOR is fixed on daily basis and calculated as a simple average of the interest rates published by
Thomson Reuters just before 12 noon every day for each term by the six largest banks, the NIBOR
panel banks, after exclusion of the lowest and highest reported interest rates, in accordance with the
regulations (FNO, 2013b). NIBOR should reflect the interest rates that lenders require for unsecured
loans in Norwegian kroner, based on what the bank will demand for loans to leading banks that are
active in the Norwegian money market and foreign exchange market. The interest rates should not be
regarded as binding offers, rather best estimates for the market interest rates (FNO, 2013a).
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MovementsDuringthe FinancialCrisis Figure 1.3 shows the money market rates for the sample
countries/areas, together with the time frame when the TAF was active. It is not readily apparent from
this image when the financial crisis starts, but it is obvious that the Lehman Brother event can be char-
acterized as a global event. A clear tendency is a general drop in all interbank rates during most of the
financial crisis. This is mostly a function of reduced policy rates, and is an effect we wish to exclude
from our analysis.
In addition two dates creating sever turmoil is included. These two dates has the potential of causing bias
in our tests. For both dates we observe interbank rates sharply inclines. This is followed by a sharp drop
as all the respective Central Banks responded by heavily decreasing policy rates combined with non-
standard measures over the following months. The dollar dry out combined with credit and liquidity
risk imposed after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, further increased the money market rates the
following days. The disentanglement following after policy rates hit rock bottom is reflected in the
different exposures and choice of monetary management strategies in respective nations, and therefore
the movements in key policy rates.
StatisticalPropertiesof InterbankRates First note the almost complete lack of co-movement in in-
terbank rates before the Lehman Brothers bust. The reason for this is the differences in local key policy
rates. This provides us with the insight that any modelling requires an adjustment for the differences
between these rates which in large part are exogenous, and outside the frame of this thesis. To adjust for
this we study the spread between Interbank rates and OIS rates.
HIstorIcaNy Money Market Rates
1) 9/08-07 BNIP Paribas suspens withdrawals TAF Program
4-- 2) 15109-08 Lehrnan Brothers filed for bankrupcty
LIBOR USD 3M
LIBOR GBP 3M1
NIBOR 3M 1
EURIBOR 3M
7
4
3
2—
2002 2004 20013 2008 2010 2012
Figure 1.3: Historically Interbank Rates
StatisticalPropertiesof TermStructures Figure 1.4 illustrates clear signs of relationships between
LIBOR rates at different maturities, - a relationship in need of disentanglernent. As highlighted through
numerical results in Cajueiro and Tabak (2007), LIBOR interest rate term structures show clear signs of
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long-term memory and persistence. Furthermore it illustrates through clustering esti mations that LIBOR
rates show signs of moving in sub groups. These findings are intuitive when observing figure 1.4. One
can see that while short interest rates moves above and below each other and close to the Federal Funds
Target Rate, the medium term interest rates hardly change direction at all, moving linearly throughout
this period. A period full of policy rate hikes from the FED. Meanwhile long term interest rates seem
to be fluctuating somewhat as well, but in a different and less erratic manner than the shortest maturity
rates. These observations have probably created some of the foundation for the expectations hypothesis
and illustrate a clear need for taking into account the entire term structure of interest rates.
— 1 Days Matufity
7 Days Maluaty
14 Days Maturity
31 Days Malurity
61 Days Maturity
91 Days Maturity
121 Days Maturity
151 Days Maturity
181 Days Maturity
211 Days Maturity
241 Days Maturity
272 Days Maturity
Fe0 Target Rate
01-06
4.5
2.5
01-05 021-05 03-05 041-05
Figure 1.4: Illustration of the Term Structure of LIBOR USD Rates.
Another observation which might not be as easy to see, is the shape of the term structure on any given
day. Throughout this period one will never observe a term structure of interest rates with a negative
slope. The market is likely to expect interest rate hikes over the future, and therefore require to be
compensated for possible future rate hike when pricing interbank loans. This is not astonishing, and
has been commented on already in this chapter. What is interesting to observe is that when long term
interest rates drop towards the beginning of Q4-2005 all other interest rates drop with them (except the
overnight and the 7 days rates), not breaking the sign of the slope for the term structure but none the
less moving almost the entire structure downwards. This reflects the interdependency property in the
term structure, and in particular the slope-factors as the expected direction of future interest rates. What
is not illustrated here is that when the LIBOR 3M rate hits its plateau of 5.5%, the yield curve at first
remains upward sloping, then changes and looses its shape. When the BNP Paribas withdrawals suspen-
sion occurs, the sign of this slope changes and follows the policy rate downwards. As such the entire
term structure reflects obvious signs of expectations for future overnight rates, which provides support
for the expectations hypothesis.
These results show a need for an attempt to model the entire yield curve and study its entire structure
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over the period. In addition, there is a need to find a method for removing this significant sign of future
expectation from the term structure in order to purify the analysis with respect to the effects of the term
auctions (TAF). The observations made here are some of the reasons for the methodology we will use
to test the effects of monetary policy commented on under Literature Review (section 1.4). As such,
and especially when observing the flattening of the curve Q4-2005, the methodology to be used must
account for the entire curve, not only the 3M LIBOR, which has been the topic of research so far.
As described by Cajueiro and Tabak (2007), and further illustrated in figure 1.4, the movement in the
shortest maturity rates (specifically 1-14 days) shows clear signs of movements based on other factors
than much of the remaining term structure, and should as such be considered for separate analysis. The
same might apply for longer term interest rates, but here the argument is not as clear cut. This is because
the movement in longer term interest rates relative to shorter maturity could help explain an increased
optimism through a raised slope (or a slope with a less negative sign than before) when announcing the
TAF program or results from the auction volumes.
1.2.5 Central Bank Rates and Overnight Indexed Swaps (OIS)
Key policy rate(s) or target rate(s) are the ofticial rates set by the authorities to regulate the monetary
management in countries. They are mainly used to point out the direction that interbank rates, partic-
ularly overnight rates, will be steered through monetary measures. The policy rate does however vary
when it comes to the monetary system. FED is an exception that has a target rate which could be com-
pared to key policy rate or official rates in other countries, and two key rates, namely the discount rate
and the Federal Funds rate. These rates are normally managed at committee meetings scheduled with
4-8 weeks in between. The rules differs somewhat between the different countries, but this is the general
procedure.
Expectations of Key Policy Rates - The Overnight Indexed Swap (OIS)
An Overnight Index Swap (OIS) is a fixed/floating interest swap whereas the floating rate is determined
by the geornetric average of published overnight rates over each time interval of a contract period7. In
other words, two players are involved (see figure 1.5 below), one who pay a fixed rate (the swap rate),
and one paying a floating rate (e.g. Eonia). The initial value of this contract is by default set to zero, so
that no cash exchange is required at initiation. As such, for these cash streams to have the same expected
value, the geometric average of each of the periods interest rates must be the same by the Law of One
Price. The rate published on such a contract is the fixed paying rate. Since the two streams are equal
in value, if the fixed rate differs from the floating rate, the floating rate must be expected to move in
the direction of the fixed rate. This is the argument why one assumes to observe expectations in this
market. In contracts where large amounts of money is involved, the different parties may impose credit
premiums. However, in the OIS contract only interest payments are exchanged (where the cash amounts
are relatively small compared to contracts where notional is exchanged) and as such these contracts
7The US, the EU and the UK all have functioning OIS markets. Conversely, there exist no operational OIS market in
Norway and hence the OIS rate in Norway is estimated by Norges Bank using other rates availablein the market and discretion.
13
contain very small amounts of credit premium. The volume of trade in this market provides a similar
argument for the absence of a liquidity premium.
Fixed rate
Floating rate Money
market rate X months (e.g. EONIA)
Figure 1.5: Two parties involved in an OIS-swap agreement
It could be argued that the estimate of the expected policy rate is not perfect since it is a measure of the
expected overnight rate. Nevertheless, in normal times the OIS would be close to the policy interest rate,
but in periods of turmoil in the financial markets there may be discrepancies between the policy rate and
the overnight rate. Among other countries, the EU area with their excess supply of liquidity during the
recent years pushed the overnight interest rate below the base rate.
These contracts are meant to contain expectations for future changes in the Federal Funds Target Rate
in the US. The same information regarding term structures apply here when it comes to long memory,
persistence and the co-relationship. Since OIS contracts do not swap any notional, only a fixed for a
floating interest rate tied to the notional of the contract, they carry very little credit risk.
As the short maturity contracts are frequently used by banks to hedge interest rate risk on short maturity
loans, they form one of the most liquid interest rate markets. Furthermore, the shortest OIS rate (1
month to maturity) seems to move flat relative to the target federal funds rate, as the Federal Open
Market Committee are unlikely to meet over the rates contracted period. As such, this interest rate will
from time to time move differently than the remaining term structure, allowing this rate to form its own
cluster when it comes to movement dynamics.
Term Structure of LOIS-Spread Figure 1.6 illustrates the movement of the term structure of the
LOIS 8• As commented in plot 1.4 the LIBOR interest rates contains market expectations regarding the
movement of the target federal funds rate. The same goes for the OIS term structure. As the contracts
have the same maturity these expectations will probably cancel out.
Through estimation we find that the term premium on overnight index swaps are smaller for the entire
sample period than for LIBOR contracts. This reflects a potential excess expectation regarding move-
ments in the other risk factors relative to the target federal funds rate for the LIBOR rate, causing the
LOIS to widen whenever expectations are formed regarding the federal funds rate. As such we can pro-
pose that the LOIS do not contain any expectations regarding the federal funds rate. It does not solely
contain the instantaneous credit and liquidity risk, but also the expected future movements in the same
factors.
Key components in need of commenting is the initial period until the beginning of Q3-07, compared to
the period of which goes under the "After Crisis Period" from Q2-10 when the TAF was terminated.
The spreads were extremely small initially, until the shift caused by the events related to BNP Paribas.
Until then it seems the US interbank market was absent of credit and liquidity spreads, as the spread is
8LOIS spread is the difference between a LIBOR rate and a OIS contract with the same time to maturity.
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Figure 1.6: Illustration of the Terin Structure of LOIS USD Rates.
as close to zero as possible, and with a close to flat term structure of interest rates. The largest jump
comes from the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy. One can observe that the term premium in the LOIS has
far from returned to historical level. It is likely that the recent events have caused a regime shift in the
interbank markets, where one now puts a premium on liquidity for long term funding, in comparison to
the past, where one could borrow to possibly the same rate for any maturity.
InternationalInterbankOISspreads Following the rational from the last two paragraphs we com-
pare 3M international interbank OIS spreads in figure 1.7.
2) 15/09-08 Lehman Brothers filed for bankrupcty
1) 9/08-07 BNP Paribas halts rederntions
3.5
3
2.5
- US Spread
UK Spread
Norway Spread
EU Spread
1.5
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2008 2009 2010
Figure 1.7: Historically International 3M LOIS Spreads.
From figure 1.7 we see from the spreads, although not moving exactly alike, that the differences in
interest rates are likely to follow from differences in forwards on currency exchange rates, (ref. covered
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interest rate parity)9.
LIBOR USD change on TermAuction(TAF)related dates In this paragraph we provide an overview
of the spread movements on Term Auction Dates. Figure 1.8 depicts the movement for different parts of
the term structure over the days where the TAF occurs. Specifically we observe a slight downward ten-
dency on the Auction Dates and Notification Dates, while the movement is opposite for the Settlement
date. It is important to notice that rates move in this period not because spreads move, but because this
is shortly after the Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy when the Federal Reserve changes its target rate. This
bias is necessary to account for in the testing methodology.
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Figure 1.8: The figures above show the change (49pread) in the spreads of different maturities. The
spread indicate the difference between LIBOR USD and FED Target Rate in the United States. It is
important to Note that the data points forining the plots is generated from the change (Spread) the
day of interest (Auction Date, Notification Date or Settlement Date) for the 60 TAF auctions held over
the period. Hence, the points forming the plot can be described as follows: A
—Spread = LIBORt— Fedt.
9Covered interest rate parity states that interest rates in two countries must be related through the price of currency spot and
forward rates of the same maturity to avoid arbitrage. For more information on this relationship see any international finance
text book or the NIBOR interest rate in this thesis.
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1.3 Research Questions
In this past section we have explained how the financial crisis started, some of the symptoms central
banks observed, and the measures they used in their attempt to nurture the global economy back to
health. Specifically it was noted that banks suddenly met a liquidity dry out following stronger sus-
picions of higher credit risk levels. Furthermore, banks became large scale property owners, started
hoarding cash, causing money markets to freeze for several maturities. As a result, Central Banks en-
acted extraordinary monetary policy measures such as the TAF. These measures were non-standard, it is
therefore of interest ot study whether they have had the intended effect. The following set of hypotheses
is formulated and argued for;
Hypothesis 1: Initiation of non-standard measures affect money market term structures The
efficient markets hypothesis claims that all new information is immediately priced into assets which
concerns itself with that information. As the facility is provided to banks and other financial institutions
the facility should directly impact interbank rates. A sudden shock to liquidity (as a surprising monetary
measure like the TAF was) should then provide an instantaneous drop in interbank rates.
Hypothesis 2: The following term auctions caused an increased probability of downward move-
ments in interbank term rates In the same way as for hypothesis 1 the notification date provides new
information to markets regarding its present state. Since the participants in the auctions are anonymous
the mare part-taking in the auctions is a positive sign regarding future development, all other things being
equal. Therefore interbank rates should observe a higher probability of downward movement, relatively
or in absolute form, especially following the notification dates.
Hypothesis 3: During the following term auctions downward movements in interbank rates and
spreads were likely to be larger than what was normally observed The size in auction volumes and
unrestricted access to the auctions for depository and other financial institutions, suggests that move-
ments in interbank rates should be larger in the downward direction on days surrounding the auctions,
than what was normally seen when observing spread falls.
Hypothesis 4: The TAF resulted in effects in related international interbank markets The inter-
connectedness in interbank markets indicates that movements in one market should affect connected
markets. If so then the TAF should cause a higher probability of downward movements following no-
tification dates and these moves should be larger in size than what was normally observed during the
crisis.
Hypothesis 5: TAF auctions resulted in abnormal movements in interbank rates beyond what can
be explained by movements in credit or liquidity premiums. Two types of liquidity exits. The first
is market liquidity, the second is funding liquidity. This last measure should be somewhat different from
the first and consists of the supply of cash in the interbank market (an institutions willingness to put its
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own money at risk when it may face the need for cash in the immediate future it self). Any such moves
not picked up by the first measure should be reflected here.
Hypothesis 6: TAF auctions resulted in abnormal movements in interbank rates, as a result of
movements in liquidity and/or credit premiums The main intention of the TAF was to provide
sufficient liquidity for financial institutions in need of this. Key causes for bankruptcy and financial
distress is insufficient liquidity. Therefore the TAF should result in less bankruptcy risk and lower credit
premiums. The access to cash became less immediate too and less premium should therefore be placed
on the ability to immediately liquidate assets.
Answering these hypotheses should provide further predictability into the possible future effects of sim-
ilar measures and a valuable contribution to future monetary management.
1.4 Current Research into TAF Effects - A Litterature Review
When reviewing the present state of research on the TAF topic it is made clear that there are questions
that remains unanswered.
The first paper written on the financial crisis was "A Black Swan in the Money Market" (Taylor &
Williams, 2008b). The purpose was to examine alternative explanations to the unusual development
in the money market with high spreads during the financial turmoil, and further to evaluate the impact
of policy actions taken to address them. A simple regression is performed on the LIBOR-OIS (LOIS)
spread with a counterpart risk factor and an indicator variable for the term auctions. Their empirical
research provide evidence for counterpart risk and expectations for future interest rates as major ex-
planatory factors for the interest spread. But, they are unable to provide conclusive answers regarding
the effect of the term auctions.
Abbassi and Linzert (2011) looked at the effectiveness of ECBs monetary policy on steering the money
market rates during the financial crisis. They use a time-series regression on the change of the interest
rates for 3M, 6M and 12M EURIBOR. As predictors they use the future expectation on short rates,
VIX1°, Corporate Bond Spreads, Eurepo-OIS spread, outstanding Main Refinancing Operations (MR0)
and Long-Term Refinancing Operation (LTRO) volumes and dummy variables for announcements of
term auctions and other monetary policy measures. Their results indicate that ECBs non-standard crisis
related monetary policy were effective measures to reduce money market rates. During the financial
crisis, the expansion of ECBs balance sheet as well as the fixed rate tenders with full allotment, had a
significant influence on the dynamics of money market rates for three, six and twelve-month maturi-
ties.
McAndrews et al. (2008) look at the effect of the Term Auction Facility (TAF) program on the liquidity
risk premium on LIBOR three-month. They use a simple econometric test where the LIBOR-OIS spread
is assumed to be linearly associated with the TAF announcements and operations as independent dummy
variables. They find that the cumulative reduction in LIBOR-OIS spreads can be associated with around
IDChicago Board Option Exchange (CBOE) Volatility Index.
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50 basis point reduction. The test is limited to the 3M LIBOR and therefore only contribute to the level
of term structure, not the slope, curvature or other factors.
This is further investigated by Kamps (2009) who analyze the long run drivers for money market rates,
LIBOR-OIS spread, through a cointegrated VAR approach. He has several findings; He finds that credit
risk and liquidity uncertainty are to be considered as the main driving forces for the EURIBOR-OIS
spread. Further non-standard or unconventional measures taken by central banks appear to have a nega-
tive effect on permanently reducing both the spread and the money market rates, most likely according
to Kamps through lightening the liquidity uncertainty. Thirdly, Kamps shows that in the long run, EU-
RIBOR/LIBOR tend to move together when controlling for non-standard policy measures, credit and
funding risk. However, in the short run he shows that they can diverge due to e.g. monetary eas-
ing.
The review of these papers illustrate what was highlighted in the introduction. None review the move-
ments in the term structure, or their sources.
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Chapter 2
Developing a Methodology
The questions posed towards the end of the previous chapter can not all be answered with the same
methodology, and none directly with methodology applied so far in present day TAF research. We
must therefore develop three new and separate methodologies, one design for each category of ques-
tions.
First, in order to test hypotheses 2 and 4 we develop a non-parametric bootstrapping based test to study
the frequencies in directional moves. Second, to test hypotheses 3 and 4 we develop a difference-of-
means-test to test the size in directional moves during TAF auctions, compared to directional moves
regardless of whether or not TAF operations are in place. Finally, to test hypotheses 1 and 5-7 we
develop an event study approach, combined with an affine term structure model to look for abnormal
movements and their possible sources.
2.1 Test 1: The Conditional Probability of Interbank Spread Drop
1To assess whether or not the presence of a the TAF program resulted in a higher probability/frequency
for interest rate drops we use a difference in frequency test. We coin this test the DMFR ("Downward
Movement Frequency Ratio"). Such a test allow us to study whether or not one would see the same
frequency of downward interest rates movements during any sample of 60 randomly chosen days during
the financial crisis.
Stated mathematically:
P [,,rt < 01/t = 1] > P [L\rt < 0]
=
P [L\rt < 0, It = 1] # Downward Movements on Specified Dates (2.1)8 > 1
P [1,7-t< 0] = # Downward Movements on All Dates
We bear in mind when constructing this test the research by Di Matteo and Aste (2002). They find
several signs of non-Gaussian behaviour in interest rate movements, and possibly therefore a tendency
The theoretical foundation for the methods described and applied in this section and the next was obtained through the
document Storvik, Geir Bootstrapping - Additional Literature for STK2120, University of Oslo Department of Mathematics,
March 2011. 
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for asymmetric behaviour. As we separate size in movements from frequency in direction of movements
such properties may appear even though the time series looks symmetric at a tirst glance. We therefore
relax the assumption of Gaussian distributed rate and spread changes for this test. It is important to
note that even for very large samples the test statistic is non-normal (Brown, Cai, & DasGupta, 2001).
Several methods attempt to account for this deviation, for instance the Agresti-Coull method (Agresti
& Coull, 1998). Our choice falls on the bootstrap because of our ability to automate the test, because
of its non-parametric form and because of the relatively small amount of variables the statistic will be
computed for.
When relaxing the Gaussian assumption we must either put in place another assumed probability dis-
tribution or find a way to approximate it. In this case we rely on an approximation of the empirical
distribution. The following example provides an intuitive interpretation of the test.
Example We claim that if the TAF had an effect on, say interest rate spreads, then one should see a
higher number of downward movements in these spreads on the notification days, where auction volumes
became public knowledge, than you would normally see in a day. Suppose we were aware of 60 TAF
auction days in a 619 days period. Our claim would then suggest that if you were to choose ten days
at random from those 619 days you would rarely observe the same frequency2 of downward interest
rate movements in that sample as when you pick those 60 specific TAF notification days. Basically we
therefore draw 60 random days over and over, 20 000 times and measure the frequency of downward
term structure movements in each sample. Then we record how often we pick a sample with the same or
higher frequency as what we observed during days of TAF operations. If we rarely pick this number, we
can claim that the difference between frequencies is significantly different. Otherwise we must admit
that even though there is a difference this might just be a result of random chance.
One caveat is that sample size governs the test-uncertainty. In this case, more TAF auctions translates
into a more accurate estimate of the difference in frequencies, and whether or not it is positive. As
such, if one had 200 auction dates, we would be more able to tell if there were a difference, even if this
difference is small. For a sample of 10 days, 90% of the frequencies lies within 70% and 20% when the
true frequency of interest rate drops is 40%. These confidence intervals narrows to (25%, 60%) for a
sample of 20 days and (33%, 55%) when the sample size is 60 days, as was the number of TAF auctions
(and as such notifications). As such, there must be a large difference in frequency of drops for this test
to work, and as such the test is crude. On the other hand, if the test show a significant difference then
this difference is large and therefore the test is worth the while.
Further the test assumes interest rate changes to be independent and identically distributed with respect
to sign. This is a second caveat. When tested most of the data seemed to obey this property.
To provide evidence for hypotheses 2 and 4 apply this test to the LOIS spread and international 101S3
spreads for movements, slopes 4 and curvatures5.
2Frequency: number of negative interest rate changes relative to total number of days drawn.
'IOIS Spread r(T) —r(7) where r(r) is the interbank rate for a loan with residual maturity 'T and 71(7-) is the OIS
rate with corresponding rnaturity.
4Slope r(1)—r(1/12) 

1-(1/12)
5Curvature:_—_0.5(r(1) + r(1/12)) —r(1/2) where r(i) is the interest rate on a loan with i years to maturity.
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The formal procedure for executing the test is as follows
Algorithm 1 The Conditional Probability of Interest Rate Drop Test
110 : < 1 H A : O > 1 <=>6L(a) > 1
B <—20000
N size( • • • ,,riv]
rt —rt_i Vt E [1, N]
P[/r < 01/t = 1]
for b E [1,B] do
i <—N random integers from [1, drawn with replacement
[,,rtle771P • • • Arril <—[L\ri, • • •
12 Lt=1 {(–cx),0]}(rttemP)
<—er11"-YI
end for
a 0.05
k = round(B x cy)
<—sort(b)
SL = e(k)
if 6L(a) > 1 then
Reject Ho
else
Keep Ho
end if
2.2 Test 2: The Expected Drop Size Test
To test whether or not moves in the term structure of interbank rates and interbank spreads were different
in size from normal than when following TAF operations, we construct a non-parametric difference-of-
means-test. A standard approach here would be to use a U-test for the difference in means. However,
the violation of normality following the argument in the previous section, suggest that a non-parametric
bootstrapping approach provides the best estimate of confidence intervals for these means (Yitzhaki,
2003). This will allow us to sidestep the bias following the Lehman Brothers, as well as any non-
normality in the empirical distributions of means.
Simply put, if we again look at 60 random days out of 619, we might observe 27 spread drops on those
days. If we measure the average size of spread movements for these dates we might see the figure 0.3
or 30 basis points. This is the average sample drop size. Repeat the draw enough times and you will get
a good idea of the distribution of the average size in these movements, and as such confidence interval.
This exercise is performed for both the Conditional and unconditional frequency. This way we obtain
expected directional movement distribution for both the TAF dates and the period as a whole. From
these distributions we create confidence intervals for the preferred significance levels (1%, 5% and 10%
in our case).
If these bootstrapped basic confidence intervals for the conditional averages do not overlap we conclude
with a significant difference in directional movement size. The procedure provided in detail in the
following algorithm.
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Algorithm 2 The Conditional Probability of Interest Rate Drop Test
(5°L((x),61?,(a)is the cxconfidence levels for the mean 61°
Ho : (62,(a), 6{),(a)) n (sida), (()) Ø
HA (62,(a), (5g(")) n (61,(a),k(a)) =
N <—number of sample interest rate changes during the financial crisis
number of sample interest rate changes during Term Auctions
B <—20000
L‘rt <—rt —rt-1 Vt E [1, N]
7o <—IP[Lr, < 0]
t < OJIt = 11
for b E [1, B] do
<—N1 random integers from [1, N], drawn with replacement
j <---N random integers from [1, N1], drawn with replacement
[ArtiemP • • rtNTP] <— ••• Drawn from the entire sample
[
A Jemp A ,tenip]
<— [Lrii • • • Ar 3 Drawn from the TAF sampleL-111
temp{( t ) Average Drop in general
b N te<— 1{(_00,01}(Ar mpt ) Average Drop on TAF date
end for
biaso <—E[5'0]
—-Yo
bias1 <—E[1] —
a 0.05 Setting the confidence level
kL = round(B x
kU = round (B x (1 —
eo <—sort(;y0)
<—sort('jl.)
(5?,= 0(kL) —-yo
61, = 0(k L) —
61?/= (kU) — -yo
= (kU) —71
if (6°L+ (yo —biaso), (-yo— biaso) + sg) n (61+ — (71 —biasi) + = ø then
Reject Ho
else
Keep Ho
end if
This hypothesis is rejected if the confidence intervals overlap for the given a. In the next chapter this
test will be performed on a range of indicators relating to the LIBOR interest rate term structure.
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2.3 Test 3: An Affine Term Structure based Event Study
2.3.1 The Event Study Set-Up
To answer hypotheses 5-7 we construct an event study. This is a methodology mainly used to study
whether economic events have effects on the value of firms. The methodology is here generalized
to determine if economic events have effects on the movernents in interest rate spreads. As normal
movement we use an affine term structure model (hereafter ATS model). MacKinlay (1997) outline the
procedure, which is adapted to the interest rate spread case:
Events to study: TAF Auction Dates, Notification Dates, Settlement Dates and the day following
Settlement days.
Normal spreads are defined at the expected spread in a ATS model governed by VAR6 dynamics.
Abnormal movements is the difference beyond what is expected and what is realized.
As time window for estimating the VAR and term structure model we use the time spanning from
the beginning of the financial crisis, up to the day before the event occurs.
The VAR model and ATS model are estimated. The expected spread for the days of events is
computed, as well as the abnormal movement defined as the difference between expected and
realized spread
The abnormal spread is regressed onto a constant to obtain the expected abnormal spread move-
ment on days of TAF operations.
Confidence intervals for the abnormal spread move is obtained through bootstrapping the regres-
sion parameter. We conclude with an abnormal effect if the confidence interval for the expected
abnormal spread move do not contain zero.
Prior to estimating the VAR model the information set included in the model is optimized by minimizing
the out-of-sample squared forecast error. Then the forecast is adjusted for any bias highlighted prior to
the initiation of the TAF program.
The following section motivates the model and its usage.
2.3.2 Motivation for the Affine Term Structure Model
A wide range of research have applied the affine factor based term structure model to study interbank and
other interest rate markets (see for instance (Ang & Piazzesi, 2003), (Duffie & Singleton, 1999),(Backus,
Foresi, & Telmer, 1998), Smith (2010), Hamilton and Wu (2012),Monfort and Renne (n.d.), de Almeida
(2004) and Pag'ës (1999)). A wide variety of factor combinations have been applied in order to estimate
the term structure model. Most commonly one see either only latent variables (unobservable factors),
macroeconomic factors and latent variables, or credit premium and liquidity premium proxies. The
choice is governed by the application of the model, the data frequency required, and the overall objective
with the research.
6 VARProcess: Vector Autoregressive Process.
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This paper is best served by observable factors working as proxy for factors driving the interbank spread
term structure. The volatility in interbank market during the period further suggest that data of daily
frequency is required to be able to capture any abnormal effects following the bi-weekly auctions in
the term auction facility. These requirements suggests that a model with observable traded proxies for
liquidity and credit premiums serves the overall objective best.
Such a model was applied in Smith (2010) and used to study the time varying term premiums in the
same interbank markets. The model provided a good fit to data in the short rate dynamic, and was well
founded.
The affine term structure model has its name from its relationship to factors assumed to govern the
interest rate dynamics. The model implies that interest rates are affine in its relationship to the governing
factors, separated by a system of non linear difference equations of coefficients. These equations account
for market participants uncertain view of the future, expressed through a term premium. Since factors
are observable and assumed to be governed by a VAR model they attain a conditional expected future
term structure, an important feature for the purpose of this problem. Computing this expectation can be
done by forecasting the factors (the forecasted term structure) or simply by studying the expected term
structure (where the factors are perfectly forecasted). It is through this model possible to provide an
explanation for the shape of the term structure through the interpretation of model parameters, as well
as determine when other factors drive the term-structure.
2.3.3 Factor Dynamics
To fully parametrize the model tradeable proxies for credit and liquidity risk must be both observable and
possible to forecast. The most common and practical way to do this is through a vector autoregressive
model. It is possibly necessary to include further factors to better explain term structure more accurate.
Figure 1.4, which depicts the movement in US interbank rates relative to the US policy rate7, illustrate
that the term structure level for interbank rates is almost completely driven by the sovereign policy rate
of that currency (in this case the USD). For instance, the market rate for USD denoted loans is mostly
determined by the target federal funds rate, and at least never drops below it. Since the policy rate is
set by the central bank (The Open Market Committee in the United States), and this thesis attempts to
expand on the impact of additional measures, the effects caused by the management of the key policy rate
must be excluded somehow. This exclusion is achieved by studying the spread between the interbank
rate and the OIS rate, since this last includes any expectation driven effects too.
Through repeated analysis following the multivariate version of the Box-Jenkins methodology (Enders,
2010) an inability to remove empirical autocorrelation was discovered. A possible reason for this in-
ability could be non-linearities in the drift component of factors. This observation suggests that the best
model is a Gaussian AR(1) process. The observed shortcomings should not cause any major inaccuracy
as the time span for any factor forecast is maximum one week.
7The US policy rate is the target federal funds rate, which financial institutions must pay to borrow federal funds overnight.
Any US based financial institution is required to have a certain amount of funds at federal bank of reserves (called federal
funds) to cover its outstanding obligations. Any bank short of federal funds will borrow from banks with excess funds here.
The rate paid for this loan is the federal funds rate.
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Consequently the choice fell on the most parsimonious model. The following equation describes its
VAR dynamics;
Xt = + 4)Xt-1 + Eat at MVN (0, I) (2.2)
where Xt = [rt Ct Lt] is a 3 x 1 vector containing risk factors. rt is the 1 month OIS rate, Ct is a
credit risk factor and Lt is a liquidity risk factor proxy. Here 1.1is a 3 x 1 vector of constants, 4) is the
3 x 3 AR1 matrix, at is a vector of independent Gaussian Distributed random shocks related through the
covariance matrix E. From equation 2.2 we see that the marginal processes takes the following form:
rt =,u1 + 1, 1rt1 + &,2Ct—1 + ø1,3Lt_i+
+ 1,1a1,t + 1,2a2,t 1,4a4,t
Ct = ,1(2 + ,;b2,1rt-1 2,3-Lt-1"+"
e1,2a1,t 2,2a2,t 2,3a3,t 2,4a4,t
Lt =1/3 + ø3,19-t-1 (-3,2Ct-1 (3,3Lt-1
6,1a1,t + e3,4a4,t
(2.3a)
(2.3b)
(2.3c)
As seen from equations 2.3a-2.3c the factors are assumed to be marginally normal distributed, coupled
by a Gaussian copula with a covariance matrix E. The model aims to estimate the dynamics of the
factors affecting the term structure over time.
2.3.4 The LOIS Short Spread Dynamics
n) L(1)Suppose r 0(t is the OIS rate with n periods to maturity at time t, while rt is the corresponding
LIBOR rate. Then the "Short Spread Dynamics" is defined as the spread between the OIS rate and the
LIBOR rate with I rnonth to maturity. As a concequence the model implies;
0(1)
rt = rt
L(1) 0(1)
rt rt =
'Yt = -Yo+ 7Xt
-y = y12]
(2.4)
-yt is the linear displacement terms picking up movements in the credit and liquidity factors. This as-
sumption has good visual empirical support (see figure 2.1). Equation 2.4 reveals the assumption that
the interbank rate with the shortest time to maturity is a affine combination of the risk factors.
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Figure 2.1: Actual vs Estimated 1 inonth LIBOR USD-OIS Spread
2.3.5 Pricing Kernel
In order to develop a term structure model it must be shown how non-defaultable zero coupon bonds
with different time to maturity is priced differently through a no-arbitrage relationship. Following from
such a pricing relationship it should be possible to construct a term structure for interest rates. The bond
pricing here relies on the stochastic discount factor methodology. (Harrison & Kreps, 1979) and (Duffie,
2008) provides the necessary result which states that in any arbitrage free environment there exists a
single random variable 11/1t,t+k,such that:
Pt = Et {Mt,t+kPt+k] (2.5)
Mt,t+k has many names, but is most commonly referred to as a stochastic discount factor, pricing kernel,
state prices or the marginal rate of substitution. The key property of M is the way it relates level and price
of risk factors to the pricing of time dependent contracts, just as CAPM relates the level of systematic
risk and the price of that risk to the price of a stock in a stock pricing model. As long as Mt,t+k is
defined relative to the risk at any asset or derivative relating to that asset, exposed to the risk at can be
priced. Hence, the challenge is to approximate M . A common approach for affine term structure is to
assume that M takes the following form:
1 , „
	
Mt,t+ = exp{ - rt - at+1 (2.6)- AtAt}-2 At = lo + 11Xt
Here ) t is the source of the term premium.
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2.3.6 The Market Prices of Risk
The main objective for the term auction facility was to lower interbank interest rate spreads.There are
two key ways to lower the interest rates on loans. The first is through a reduction in the price of risk, the
second is through lowering the level of the risk factors. So far we have covered two sources of risk and
how it relates to the pricing of fixed income instruments. The first market price of risk was yt. This factor
is the short term difference between the interest rate paid on an OIS contract and the interest rate paid on
a LIBOR loan. This varies through time and is affected by the differences in characteristics between the
contracts, mainly market liquidity, probability of default, exposure at default. As such any movement
in ryt follows from a move in the liquidity and credit proxies, related to how these factors are priced.
In comparison ) t covers the market term premium through the correlation in the risk factors and their
dynamics over time. It will attempt to capture how the liquidity, credit and spread level factors affect
interest rate uncertainty for longer term loans, such as 4-12 months. This component will therefore help
explain the differences in prices on long term liquidity, compared to short term liquidity.
2.3.7 Arbitrage Free Pricing Functions
Following from expression 2.5 it is easy to show that the price of a zero coupon bond with h periods to
maturity is given as:
B (t,t + h) = Et[Mt,t+1B(t + 1, t + h)]
= Et[Mt,t+i-Et[Mt+i,t+2B(t + 2, t + h)]]
= Et{Mt,t+} Mt+l,t+2B(t + 2, t + h)]
h-1
= Et[ mt+i,t+i+i]
i=0
= Et[II exp{—rt+i /t_Fiat+i+1 —
i=o
This price relationship holds for any term structure driven by these factors in this fashion. From here this
paper part with Smith (2010), and assume that a small term premium is present in the overnight indexed
interest rate swap market too.
These term premiums are expected to differ in factors and to vary to some extent over time. This leads
to slightly different stochastic discount factor. Our reasoning behind these choices comes from the
differences in risk in the OIS market and the LIBOR market, but we argue that since one is exposed to
some interest rate risk for longer term OIS contracts there should still be a positive term premium in this
market. Following from expression 2.7 we use the following:
BL (t,t + h) = exp {AL,h
B° t + h) = exp {Ao,h Bio,hXt}
(2.8)
In appendix 4.3 it is showed that this relationship holds whenever A,/, and B' h follows the following
(2.7)
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recursive equations for the LIBOR term structure
	
AL,h = AL,h-1+ BIL,h_1(1,1 - ) + BL,h-i - -Yo (2.9)
BL,h = -BIL,h_1(4) - Eif) - -y
where AL,1 =- -^(13 and BL = — yi,i y1,2][1 . For the OIS term structure we have;
- - - 

Ao,h = Ao,h-1+ go,h_1(12 - + EESO,h-1 (2.10)
BO,h = -1330,h_1(<1.- - -y
where A0,1 = 0 and B1 = — [1 0 0] . Equations 2.9 and 2.11 illustrate that we are dealing with
non-linear parameter relationships, and that we can write the term structure of interbank rates and OIS
rates as:
L(h) i
rt = --h (AL'h + -131L,hXt)
0(h) i i A
rt = -- Vio' h + BahXt)
h


(2.11)
2.3.8 LOIS Spreads and TermPremiums
Given the closed form term structure equations developed in the previous section it is now possible to
see that the spread between interbank rates and OIS rates can be written as a closed form function itself.
L(h) 0(h)
rt —rt = (AL,t, + 131111)(t) + (Ao,h + Bio,hXt)
--h ((AL,h - AO,h) + (BL.h Bo,h)1 Xt)
S(h)
rt = --h (As,h + BhXt)
(2.12)
Where As,h and 13h denote the coefficients for the term structure of the LOIS spread, again as an
affine function of the model factors. An interesting property of this term structure is to understand how
forward rates perform as expectations of future spot rates. From this procedure the expected future term
structure can be expressed as:
E t[r"tsli(_111)= E t [- ViS,h + Bis,hXt+1)]
A
= (As
'h + gs,hEt[xt+1})h 

1
= (As
'h 13's
+ 4)Xt))
h 

(2.13)
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The product is an expected future term structure which works as a short term forecast for the term
structure of LOIS spreads. Another bi-product is the possibility of obtaining non-parametric, historical
forecasting errors, and as such we can study whether or not the movement in the different parts of the
term structure moved as expected during the initial announcement of the TAF program.
2.3.9 Abnormal Movement in the Term Structure of Spreads
According to the event study test normal movements in the spread constitutes those predicted by 2.13.
Abnormal movements the constitutes any movement above or below this level.
S(h) S(h) S(h)iArt = rt — [rt+ (2.14)
We conclude that if Arts(h) > 0 in a significant way, then there has been movements in the term structure
following the TAF.
2.3.10 Econometric Methodology
Sever complications normally (Smith, 2010) afise when attempting to estimate this model directly. It is
therefore natural that a large part of the research related to this model is focusing on estimating it. Since
the application of the model is the event study, the best possible forecast is our goal. Recognizing this
and the issues related to estimating 10and l we sidestep this problem by directly estimating the coeffi-
cients As(h) and Bs' (h) through a least squares regression, since the model assumes these coefficients to
be constants. Expression 2.13 indicates that interest rates only follows an autoregressive dynamic when-
ever certain requirements are placed on the relationship between the AR1 matrix for the VAR dynamics,
its eigenvalues, eigenvectors and the autocorrelation in the interest rate dynamics. The result for these
dynamics will not be provided here but a comment can be found in Appendix 5.
Algorithm 3 Parameter Estimation Procedure
I. Estimate el = E in the vector autoregressive process via a OLS procedure
2. Hold 01 fixed and use the following equations to estimate Vh Asj„ Bs,h.
For each h E [1 . . . H] we estimate the coefficients As(h) and B si(h) through an OLS procedure.
— h • Rt(h) = [1 Xt] [,As(h +
IDS(h)
where R(h) = [Rt—k(h) Rt_k+i(h) • Rt(h)]' is a vector of interest rates maturing h periods
from now, and Xt = [Xt_k • • • Xt]' is a matrix of factor realizations up to and including date t
(2.15)
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2.4 Variables
To estimate the model provided in the previous sections LIBOR USD rates from 15 different maturi-
ties(from 1 day to 1 year) were collected from Datastream. Sampled rates contained 2683 daily obser-
vations between December 23rd 2003 and November 14th 2011. Similarly daily OIS rates for 12(1 -
12 months) different maturities were collected from data stream, containing 2432 observations between
December 23rd 2003 and April 17th 2013. In addition the overnight federal funds rate was used as a
proxy for the ovemight rate in the OIS term structure. For maturities where only one of the term struc-
tures had an observable rate the rate for the other term structure was interpolated using the methodology
of Adams and Van Deventer (1994). The related MATLAB function is provided in appendix 6.
Similar data sets was downloaded for UK (LIBOR GBP and OIS GBP) and EU (EURIBOR and EU-
RIOIS). As no functioning OIS market exists for Norway only Interbank rates for 9 Maturities was
obtained, but the data set was of similar size as those already mentioned.
The total dataset used consist of more than 1812 dates of observations from a total of 143 time series,
totalling more than 259 000 data points. The remainder of this section discusses the various proxies
applied in the different tests. First proxies for slope and curvature are commented. Then proxies for
factors in the VAR model are reviewed.
2.4.1 Slopeand CurvatureFactor
To study whether or not the term structure moved as a complete object and not as a set of independent
rates, it is necessary to find proxies that can summarize the movements of the entire set of rates. Prin-
cipal Component Analysis provides evidence of the possibility to summarize term structure movements
through three factors; Level, Slope and Curvature. These factors explain up to 99.36% of all yield curve
variation. As a proxy for level the short rate is used. As a proxy for the slope we use the following
expressesion
Slope Factor (2.16)
in a similar fashion
1
Ct = —2(rt(1) + rt(1/12)) —rt(112)Curvature Factor (2.17)
A downward movement in the slope factor coefficient a smaller difference between long and short rates
and therefore a flatter spread structure. This holds when the coefficient is positive, which it is for the
spread in 91% of our sample, and in the entire financial crisis set.
A downward movement in the curvature coefficient (or convexity coefficient) indicate that medium term
rates move even further away from the average of long and short term rates. This coefficient is negative
for 91% the sample dates. When this occurs the 1-6 months part of the term structure becomes flatter
relative to the 6-12 months part of the term structure. Based on which hypothesis you prescribe to this
can imply different effects.
The effects are illustrated in figure 2.2.
st = 1 —1/12
rt(1) —rt(1/12)
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Figure 2.2: Effects of Increased Slope and Curvature on the Term Structure
2.4.2 Repurchase Agreements (REPO)
Repurchase Agreements (REPOs) are contracts for sale and future (re)purchase of financial assets, most
often Treasury securities. The price of a REPO should be higher than the sales price, representing the
premium of time and referred to as the Repo rate. REPO rates can be of any duration. On termination
date, the seller pays interest for the use of funds and repurchase the asset at the price agreed (price
it was sold for). Therefore a REPO is in effect a short term interest bearing loan agreement against
collateral.
The REPO rate can be expressed as follows:
Such that,
1 1
Principal = Par value x Dirty price x 	
Hair Cut 100
(Days Trade is on)
Repo Interest = Principal x Rate x
360
(2.18)
(2.19)
The 3 months composite offered REPO rate was downloaded through Datastream for the same time span
as the remaining variables.
2.4.3 Factor Proxies
The term structure model is chosen to be governed by credit and liquidity premiums. This is the price of
liquidity risk and credit risk. Credit risk involves the risk that borrowers fail to repay or meet contractual
obligations to a lender, making the lender loose the financial reward or the principal. Liquidity risk
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implies that an investment cannot be bought or sold quickly enough in the market to limit or prevent
losses. During the time path of the financial crisis these two risks affected the premium and hence the
OIS-spread.
(Market) Liquidity risk should not be confused with liquidity funding risk which is an aggregate for lack
of willingness to lend money in the interbank market, in order to make sure once own liquidity access is
secured. No tradeable proxy is well established for this type of risk, and it is thus excluded from explicit
participation in the model.
One can decompose and proxy the money market spread into a credit and liquidity factor as fol-
lows;
(LIBOR-OIS) (LIBOR-Repo) + a(OfTR-OnTR)+Term Premium
(2.20)
Money Marke Spread = Credit risk + Liquidity risk
where the REPO market is absent credit risk while the Off-the Run/On-The-Run spread is a proxy for
liquidity risk.
Note that such a decomposition is problematic since credit and liquidity risk are intertwined. A bank
facing problems raising funds will also face a greater risk of default. Raising funds will be categorized
as liquidity risk, while greater probability of default represent increased credit risk (Wells, 2007).
We will therefore use the following proxies for liquidity and credit risk to be implemented in our
model:
Credit proxy As credit proxy we use the LIBOR-REPO spread. LIBOR contracts that are unsecured,
while REPOs are collaterlized and secured cash loans at fixed rates. We use 1 month, 3 month and 12
month maturities for respectively money market and REPO rates. The collateral in the REPO contract is
U.S. Treasury securities, UK gilts and EURIBOR composite, enabling us to identify these REPO rates
as risk free, while money market rates are unsecured and hence the spread between the two, respectively
the LIBOR-REPO spread, is a good proxy for credit risk since it reflects the credit risk premium involved
in the money market rates.(Taylor (2009) Taylor and Williams (2008b) and Smith (2010))
Liquidity proxy As liquidity proxy we will use the the Off-The-Run On-The-Run spread for 10 year
US Treasury Notes.
A treasury security is considered on the run until the auction day of its next issuance. This relation-
ship was studied in Barclay, Hendershott, and Kotz (2006) where one finds that trades drop on average
86% in value and 92% in number of trades when these securities go off the run. II is clear that when
such assets goes off-the-run liquidating them becomes much harder. Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009)
provides a model separating market liquidity risk and funding risk, which is a traders unwillingness to
put its employers/banks money at risk, while asset is as described above. Chordia, Sarkar, and Sub-
rahmanyam (2005) finds considerable levels of correlation across assets classes when studying liquidity
across markets.
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To compute the liquidity premium G&kaynak, Sack, and Wright (2007) method is applied to the relating
dataset, taking the difference between the implied off-the-run 10 year treasury-note (Giirkaynak, Sack, &
Wright, 2013) and the on-the run version of the same contract (Datastream). This combination provides
a liquidity premium.
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Chapter 3
Evidence and Conclusions
This chapter reports and comments on the empirical evidence. First; hypotheses 1 is analysed graphi-
cally. Second; hypotheses 2 and 4 is reported through an application of Test 1. Third; hypothesis 3 and
4 is reported from an application of Test 2. Fourth; hypotheses 5-7 is reported through an application of
Test 3. Last; an overall conclusion and concluding remarks are provided.
3.1 Hypothesis 1: The TAF Initiation
Hypothesis 1: Initiation of non-standard measures affect money market term structures. An
initial question for the interbank market is whether the initiation of the TAF impacted interest rates.
Figure 3.1 illustrates that shorter maturity rates were abnormally affected by this initiation. The result
is obtained in the following manner; First, the VAR-AST model estimated in section 3.5.1 was applied.
Second, historical forecast-errors were used to create empirical confidence intervals. Third, the expected
term structure was calculated based on a perfect forecast of factors (for more detail on this procedure, see
section 3.5.1 and onwards). Last, the realized term structure is compared to the expected term structure
and its confidence intervals. The conclusion is further supported by the reversion to the contidence
interval for forecast when studying the forecast for the December 14th Term Stmcture.
The finding is supported by the efficient markets hypothesis, stating that markets should immediately re-
act to new information and reprice itself accordingly. The measure seemed to have an effect on the short
term interest rates beyond what the model could predict, and might therefore be seen as a reaction in a la-
tent factor. It is possible that the deviation could be a change in the funding liquidity premium. However,
since no exiting satisfactory proxy exists for this risk, such an impact could not be confirmed.
Findings from Ait-Sahalia et al. (2012) support hypothesis 1, indicating that initiation of non-standard
policy measures provided an impact on interest rates.
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Figure 3.1: From top to bottom we observe the one day forecast for the term structure for the day of TAF
initiation press-release, one day after the initiation and two days after respectively. Dates are December
12th 2007, December 13th 2007 and December 14th 2007.
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3.2 Hypothesis 2: Probability for Interbank Rates and Spreads to tighten
Increased following The Term Auctions
This hypothesis was tested through an application of Test 1 (see section 2.1 for the test and appendix 4.2
the for results).
The US interbank rates showed a significantly higher propensity to fall on notification dates than oth-
erwise during the financial crisis. The tendency to drop was in particular strong for rates on loans with
maturity ranging 1-6 months .
The probability of downward movements in the curvature index was also significantly higher than nor-
mal. Such an observation indicate that medium term rates moved, while short and long parts of the term
structure remained unchanged.
These two effects could be results of both actual and expected future cuts in the federal funds target rate,
and needs to be adjusted for. For the LOIS spread, which contains these adjustments, both the slope and
curvature had a significantly higher probability of falling on TAF auction dates.
Overall the premium paid on longer maturity loans (12 months) tends to drop relative to the interest paid
on shorter term loans (indicated from the slope). Such an effect is the consequence of a convex 1term
structure for the LOIS spread, becoming even more convex on TAF dates.
3.3 Hypothesis 3: Interest Rates and Spreads Tended To Move More fol-
lowing TAF auctions
This hypothesis was tested through an application of Test 2 (see section 2.2 for the test and appendix 4.3
for the results).
The LIBOR USD rates showed a tendency to decline more following TAF auctions than on other days
during the financial crisis, provided that they fell. The difference was in particular apparent on TAF-
notification dates, but was not significant.
On the one hand, no single rate in the LIBOR USD term structure seemed to experience any drops
significantly larger than normal following TAF-auction dates. The same is true for LOIS spreads in
general, except for the spread with 3 months to maturity. This seemed to drop about twice as far as
normal, (3 compared to 1.7Basis points) provided the TAFauction was followed by a drop.
On the other hand, even though no single rate or spread tended to move more than normal, the story is
quite different for the term structure as a whole. First, the slope tended to move far less on TAF auction
dates than normal (-2.4 vs -3.3 basis points). Second, the spread curvature moved much more on both
notification dates and settlement dates (-3.8 and -3.7 vs -2.4 basis points). Last, the term structure be-
came more flat or convex following auction dates. This last finding follows from the negativecorrelation
between convexity and slope (A correlation of -0.28).
1Convexity is the same as a negative curvature measure
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The results in this section suggest that no conclusion may be drawn regarding the drop size of any single
part of the term structure, but that longer maturity rates tends to fall further relative to rates with shorter
maturity.
3.4 Hypothesis 4: The TAF Impacted International Interbank Markets
This hypothesis was tested through an application of both Test 1 and Test 2 (see section 2.1 and 2.2 for
tests, and appendix 4.2 and 4.3 for results).
Interbank interest rates on all maturities for all markets in the sample showed a higher propensity to
decline on notification dates than what was normally observed during the crisis. These declines were
furthermore larger on average than what was else observed in the period. Even though a zero hypothesis
of no difference, in either drop-size or drop-frequency, could not be rejected at any standard confidence
levels for any single rate, the overall pattem is clear.
EURIBOR Empirical tests suggest that in the EURIBOR term structure, the short term rates was
the part most sensitive to TAF auctions. This suggestion is confirmed by the following two observa-
tions;
First, the short term EURIOIS spread tended to fall both farther (2.7 basis points compared to 1.3 basis
points normally) and more frequent following TAF auctions. No such evidence is found for longer
maturity rates. Second, the first observation is supported by a tendency for a steeper, but not necessarily
more convex interbank interest rate curve.
Three observations suggest there might be different overall effects to the term structure from the TAF
auctions;
First, no changes seem to be apparent regarding the frequency for directional change following TAF
auctions for individual maturities. Second, the same conclusion can be drawn for the size in any declines
for the same dates. Third, short term rates seem to become more expensive compared to longer term
rates (6-12 rnonths) overall.
However, the contradicting evidence did not adjust for changes and expected future changes in policy
rates. Therefore the initial conclusion remains; the short term part of the EURBOR term structure is the
only part showing significant signs of being affected by the TAF auctions.
LIBOR GBP For the LIBOR GBP term structure long term rate was the part most sensitive to the
TAF-auctions. This conclusion follows from three observations.
First, the 12 months LOIS GBP spread tended to drop further and more frequent on TAF-settlement
dates. Second, the slope of the LOIS GBP term structure fell on average twice as far and 24% more
frequently on the same dates. Last, the term structure was 39% more likely to become less convex on
TAF settlernent days.
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So, even though the LIBOR GBP term structure tended to drop overall and become more convex, but
not steeper, these effects are mostly the result of changes in BoE policy rate, and expectations for their
future levels.
NIBOR In Norway the short term rates was the part most strongest influenced by the TAF program,
but only relative to the longer term rates, not in absolute levels. This indication is a result of three
observations.
First, the NIBOR term structure tended to be more likely to become steeper on TAF settlement dates.
Second, it was more likely to become more convex. Last, it showed no consistent change in probability
of decline for any single rate.
As the Norwegian Interbank Market lack a well functioning OIS market the analysis becomes less sub-
stantial here. Since information regarding TAF results (released on Notification Dates) become available
first the day after in Norway, it is likely that this is the effect observed here.
In General The TAF program impacted international interbank term structures, but this was felt in
different ways. While the GBP market reacted by on average letting long term rates drop, the EUR
market dropped short term rates. The Norwegian market is not comparable in the same way, as the
observations were not adjusted for changes in the policy rates.
What was common for all, was that the effect was most strongly felt on settlement days for the program.
This is most likely because it was the day when information concerning results from TAF auctions is
released in Europe.
3.5 ATSM-VARbasedEventStudyEstimation
3.5.1 VARDynamics
In hypotheses 5 and 6 an Affine Term Structure (ATS) model is applied to look for abnormal movements
in interest rates. For the dynamics governing this model we estimate the parameters for a VAR(1)
process with three factors: the shortest OIS rate in the dataset (1 month), the credit proxy and the
liquidity premium proxy defined in section 2.4. These parameters were estimated using data ranging
from Decernber 23rd 2003 to November 14th 2011. The entire data set was used to estimate the model
parameters, as the motivation for the model usage is not forecasts but descriptive analysis. If the model
were estimated with the objective to forecast and not describe in-sample-dynamics, then this procedure
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Table 3.1: This figure reports the estimates of parameters for the VAR(1) model and the short rate
dynamics. All the Eigenvalues of 4)1 are below 1 and as such the process do not explode. The short
rate dynamics parameters are obtained by estimating the regression equation LIBOR-OIS = -yo+-gXt,
where the short rate in Xt is set to zero, and the credit variable and liquidity proxy are kept unchanged.
We report standard errors under assumption of Gaussian residuals. EE' is the Cholesky decomposed
covariance matrix.
would be flawed, as it would only describe parts of the dynamics experienced.
Xt = [rt Ct Lt]


(3.1a)
Xt = p, + + Eat (3.1b)
LIBORt - rt = -yo + [o 71,1 71,1] -X1 (3.1c)
'Yo, and 71,2 are found by estimating regression equation 3.1c. Then the parameters in equation 3.1a
are estimated using an OLS procedure. The results are reported in table 3.1.
The first line shows the relationship between the short rate and the other variables. Three properties are
worth mentioning here. First, the short rate has a positive drift. Second, a positive shock in the credit
factor results in a upward move in the short rate the following day. Third, a shock to the liquidity factor
has the opposite effect. Both of these effects are significant at the 1% level.
The second line explains how the credit factor (C1) is related to the two other variables in the model. It
is seemingly independent from both, as a shock to either the short rate or the liquidity factor result only
in insignificant moves in the credit factor.
The third line explains how the liquidity factor (Li) is affected by moves in either the short rate or credit
premium. A move in the short rate will create a downward movement in the liquidity factor, while the
opposite is true for a move in the credit factor. Both of these effects are significant.
The credit factor is Granger-causing both the liquidity factor and the short rate factor, as both these
factors are significantly affected, but do not affect the credit factor. It is thus contributing significant
predictive power to the movements in these two factors. These observations are very similar to those
obtained in Smith (2010), but in our estimates there are also an interdependence relationship between
the liquidity factor and the short rate.
As hypothesized in chapter 2 the credit exposure in the overnight indexed swaps (OIS) with short time
to maturity is very small. It should therefore only be marginally affected by an increase in the credit
premium, a property reflected in the estimated parameters. A raise in the liquidity premium indicates
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a market fleeing to more liquid instruments and a fear for worse economic conditions in the immediate
future. Such fears create expectations for policy rate cuts, causing the shortest OIS rates to drop. These
are the intuitive reasons for relationships observed in the estimates.
In a similar fashion the liquidity premiurn is expected to move in the same direction as the credit pre-
mium. An environment with climbing credit premiums increases fears for default. In order to mitigate
such risk, a logical strategy is to move into more liquid securities. On a grand scale this creates a flight
to liquidity, triggering higher prices and reduced returns on these liquid instruments. This is a possible
theory explaining the movements observed in the model.
The dynamics for the one month LIBOR rate is given by the parameters in -yoand -yl. These parameters
provides an intuition concerning how movements in the credit and liquidity factors affect the spread. In
more specific terms, a shock in the credit factor would contribute to an almost equal movement in the
LOIS spread (on average 0.81 percentage points). This indicates that a large part of the spread between
loans, where the Notional/Face Value is exposed and those where it is not (Swaps), mainly consists
of credit risk. Notice also that, given a realized value for the credit factor, an increase in the liquidity
premium causes a drop in the short term LIBOR rate. This could be a result of expected interest rate
cuts/drops.
3.5.2 Main Estimation
A more detailed study is performed for the US interbank term structure of interest rate spreads in this
section. This procedure is limited to the US, partially because this was the market where the effect of the
TAF was intended, partially because of the lack of factor proxies for the other sample markets.
Two different measures are used to define normal movements. In the first model the factors are assumed
to be perfectly forecasted (No forecasting error). In the second, factors are forecasted, hence the model
contains forecasting errors. The source of any difference between the two models abnormal movement-
estimate, can be determined in such a set-up. This determination is made through the knowledge of
sources for errors. It is known that the output from the first model contains no forecasting errors for the
VAR dynamics, while the second one does.
To determine an abnormal movement a prerequisite is an estimate of a normal movement, and normal
movement is then a result of a forecast. For this forecast to be as precise as possible, two key tasks are
performed; First, an adjustment is made for any bias. Second, a determination of how much historical
data to include. The first part of the data set2 is used to detect and adjust for these two issues.
Results from trial estimations indicate that, including more historical data when producing term structure
forecasts, will generate larger forecasting-errors (SSE). When minimizing the squared errors of the
historical term structure forecasts, the least amount of historical data included seems to be optimal.
This in turn suggests that an exact3 estimate of factor loadings will produce the smallest forecasting
2August 9th 2007 - December 12th - 2007, which is the the time span ranging from the BNP Paribas event to the initiation
of the TAF.
3The Model has 4 factor loadings per maturity. The model assumes that these loadings should be somewhat constant over
time. Therefore an exact estimate in turn suggests the usage of the interest rates the previous four days to compute these
loadings exactly, that is without errors.
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errors.
The optimality of excluding historical data is most likely caused by the complete change in dynamics
from before to after the BNP event. As such we will proceed with the exact estimates of the term
structure factor loadings.
Estimation where Factor Realizations are Known
The expected term structure model is tested for any bias during the pre-TAF part of the financial crisis,
and no significant bias is found in the out-of-sample forecasts. Factor loadings are estimated using the
term structures for the four previous days. The expected term structure is then forecasted using the
computed factor loadings and the realized factor values.
The estimated abnormal movements are computed through equation 2.14 for all the identified date
groups4. Then abnormal movements are regressed onto a constant, and the corresponding regression
coefficient is estimated through an OLS procedure. This exercise is performed for each of the date
groups and each of the maturities. The resulting coefficients are known as the expected abnormal move-
ments, and are summarized as Ôin tables 3.2 for the different date groups. To account for any estimators
not following the t-distribution, we used a non-parametric regression bootstrap to construct the confi-
dence intervals for the parameters (8,r,and 8u denote the 5% confidence intervals), instead of using the
standard t-test. The confidence intervals are reported next to the corresponding estimators.
Estimation where Factor Valuesare Estimated/Forecasted
When factors are forecasted, the least amount of historical information is still empirically optimal.
Therefore the method employed here is the same as the one in the case where factors are known. In
this forecasting problem a small bias of three basis points was found in the pre-TAF part of the dataset.
This bias was adjusted for when estimating abnormal movements. The adjustment procedure assumed
that the level of this bias was constant throughout the crisis.
In this case we use forecasted factors instead of realized factors as input in the term structure forecasting
model. Beyond this, the same procedure as in the case with know factors, is used to compute expected
abnormal movemements and their confidence intervals. Results are reported in table 3.3.
4Date groups: Auction Dates, NotificationDates, Settlement Dates and Settlement Dates +1.
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DTM 0 51, du DTM 0 (51, årr
1 -0.0674 -0.0038 -0.1540 1 -0.0935 -0.2276 0.0074
7 0.0405 -0.0555 0.1889 7 -0.0438 -0.1472 0.0618
14 0.0309 -0.0333 0.1300 14 -0.0745 -0.1469 -0.0104
30 0.0006 -0.0204 0.0225 30 -0.0061 -0.0446 0.0301
60 0.0103 -0.0131 0.0366 60 -0.0020 -0.0389 0.0344
90 0.0021 -0.0199 0.0248 90 -0.0054 -0.0407 0.0292
121 0.0084 -0.0131 0.0320 121 -0.0229 -0.0569 0.0082
152 0.0042 -0.0205 0.0307 152 -0.0330 -0.0693 -0.0005
183 -0.0052 -0.0317 0.0230 183 -0.0569 -0.1025 -0.0165
214 -0.0018 -0.0286 0.0268 214 -0.0202 -0.0540 0.0118
244 -0.0018 -0.0292 0.0278 244 -0.0362 -0.0732 -0.0023
274 -0.0085 -0.0421 0.0263 274 -0.0537 -0.0973 -0.0143
305 0.0000 -0.0334 0.0370 305 -0.0431 -0.0862 -0.0044
335 -0.0067 -0.0476 0.0344 335 -0.0432 -0.0866 -0.0039
365 -0.0052 -0.0427 0.0336 365 -0.0558 -0.1019 -0.0137


(a)Auction Date


(b) Notification Date


DTM 0 61, 8u DTM


0


1 0.0166 -0.0891 0.1593 1 -0.0069 -0.0995 0.0936
7 0.0001 -0.0932 0.1172 7 -0.0481 -0.1672 0.0492
14 0.0244 -0.0400 0.1051 14 -0.0073 -0.1205 0.0732
30 0.0134 -0.0134 0.0413 30 -0.0483 -0.1845 0.0405
60 0.0123 -0.0121 0.0368 60 -0.0363 -0.1193 0.0201
90 0.0100 -0.0125 0.0317 90 -0.0206 -0.0970 0.0294
121 0.0031 -0.0229 0.0254 121 -0.0283 -0.1178 0.0266
152 -0.0038 -0.0307 0.0198 152 -0.0247 -0.1090 0.0261
183 -0.0076 -0.0363 0.0182 183 -0.0362 -0.1382 0.0271
214 -0.0218 -0.0603 0.0106 214 -0.0074 -0.0678 0.0383
244 -0.0164 -0.0533 0.0164 244 -0.0175 -0.0913 0.0309
274 -0.0254 -0.0669 0.0101 274 -0.0258 -0.1063 0.0253
305 -0.0387 -0.1069 0.0139 305 -0.0480 -0.1638 0.0231
335 -0.0359 -0.1048 0.0168 335 -0.0488 -0.1574 0.0185
365 -0.0325 -0.0863 0.0113 365 -0.0281 -0.0987 0.0209
(c) Settlement Date (d) Settlement Date+ I
Table 3.2: Expected Abnormal Movements when factor values are known.
DTM: Days to Maturity. Estimated expected abnorrnal movement. (8L, (5u): Basic confidence inter-
vals at 5% significance level.
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DTM 0 6L 6u DTM 0 6L (Sti
1 -0.0818 -0.0195 -0.1703 1 -0.1022 -0.2099 -0.0237
7 -0.0478 -0.1166 0.0205 7 -0.0939 -0.1594 -0.0425
14 -0.0231 -0.0818 0.0305 14 -0.0632 -0.1210 -0.0175
30 0.0117 -0.0045 0.0281 30 -0.0056 -0.0245 0.0123
60 0.0139 0.0007 0.0289 60 -0.0060 -0.0266 0.0138
90 0.0120 -0.0024 0.0271 90 -0.0102 -0.0304 0.0084
121 0.0132 -0.0021 0.0297 121 -0.0108 -0.0294 0.0064
152 0.0103 -0.0069 0.0284 152 -0.0157 -0.0352 0.0022
183 -0.0085 -0.0444 0.0196 183 -0.0290 -0.0664 0.0016
214 -0.0144 -0.0508 0.0144 214 -0.0316 -0.0677 -0.0039
244 -0.0220 -0.0680 0.0121 244 -0.0396 -0.0849 -0.0072
274 -0.0251 -0.0650 0.0077 274 -0.0402 -0.0799 -0.0085
305 -0.0359 -0.0826 0.0031 305 -0.0474 -0.0907 -0.0159
335 -0.0409 -0.0930 0.0016 335 -0.0465 -0.0938 -0.0135
365 -0.0349 -0.0858 0.0053 365 -0.0450 -0.0937 -0.0089
DTM
(a) Auction Date
0 6L 6u DTM
(b) Nonfication Date
0 61, 6u
1 -0.0324 0.0074 -0.0662 1 -0.058 -0.13901 0.0405
7 -0.0779 -0.1537 -0.0263 7 -0.0233 -0.0797 0.0402
14 -0.0258 -0.0847 0.0173 14 -0.0016 -0.0416 0.0445
30 0.0050 -0.0126 0.0246 30 -0.0019 -0.0226 0.0162
60 -0.0020 -0.0169 0.0118 60 -0.0113 -0.0299 0.0039
90 0.0016 -0.0095 0.0128 90 -0.0137 -0.0343 0.0055
121 -0.0005 -0.0097 0.0090 121 -0.0114 -0.0292 0.0062
152 -0.0047 -0.0137 0.0046 152 -0.0104 -0.0265 0.0062
183 -0.0127 -0.0226 -0.0028 183 -0.0144 -0.0311 0.0031
214 -0.0198 -0.0325 -0.0078 214 -0.0059 -0.0249 0.0161
244 -0.0173 -0.0292 -0.0057 244 -0.0134 -0.0300 0.0042
274 -0.0243 -0.0355 -0.0131 274 -0.0225 -0.0406 -0.0030
305 -0.0356 -0.0501 -0.0216 305 -0.0190 -0.0404 0.0026
335 -0.0359 -0.0496 -0.0228 335 -0.0203 -0.0400 -0.0006
365 -0.0267 -0.0419 -0.0119 365 -0.0179 -0.0382 0.0034
(c) Settlement Date (d) Settlement Date+ I
Table 3.3: Expected Abnormal Movements when factor values are unknown.
DTM: Days to Maturity. Estimated expected abnormal movement. (8L,Su): Basic confidence inter-
vals at 5% significance level.
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3.6 Hypothesis 5: TAF Auctions were associated with Abnormal Move-
ments in Interbank Spreads beyond what can be explained by changes
in Credit andor Liquidity Premiums
This hypothesis was tested by using the results from table 3.2. The negated form of the hypothesis
is rejected at a significance level of 5%, due to the significant abnormal moves for maturities above 4
months.
The Notification dates for TAF auctions show a strong association to abnormal movements for the In-
terbank spread term structure. The association is limited to the long term parts of the term structure, but
indicate that movements in the liquidity and credit premium are unable to explain the variation in the
entire term structure.
The results furthermore show strong signs connecting the abnormal movements to the TAF. The fol-
lowing observations support this conclusion. The moves are limited to the Notification date of the TAF
Auctions. This is the date where the market receives information regarding auction results, and thus
the day when re-pricing should occur if one assumes an efficient market. Second, there is no abnormal
moves on the other days, with the exception of the ovemight rate. If other days showed clear but dif-
ferent patterns of abnormal movement, there would either be something wrong with the model, or other
systemic events creating a problem separating the sources of any effects. Third, the direction of the ab-
normal moves are consistent with the programs intention. They are consistently producing rates that are
lower than expected, even under the assumption of perfect forecasts of future credit conditions.
3.7 Hypothesis 6: TAF Auctions were associated with Abnormal Move-
ments in Interbank Spreads, as a result of changes in credit andor
liquidity premiums
This hypothesis was tested by using the results frorn table 3.3. The negated form of the hypothesis is
rejected at a significance level of 5%. The conclusion follows as a range of new maturities experience
abnormal movements, which did not do so at the previous test (results in table 3.2). Notice in particular
the short term spread for the term structure on Notification dates, and the spreads on longer maturities on
Settlement dates. These spreads now show signs of abnormal moves (marked gray in table 3.3) resulting
from systemic, but unpredictable moves in the factors governing the term structure dynamics. The idea
behind the reasoning is that these spreads did not show signs of such behaviour in the previous test, and
the only thing that has changed is the new unpredictability in factors.
The new abnormal movements follow from a combination of variation in factor loading and the fore-
casting errors for factor forecasts. Thus the source is time-varying risk and risk premiums.
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3.8 Conclusion
This thesis has reported on the possible effects of the Term Auction Facility (TAF) on international
interbank interest rate spread dynamics.
A wide range of research have been conducted on this program, but none seem to answer the question
"How is the interbank term structures impacted by the TAF?" 6 hypotheses are motivated, and three tests
are constructed to test them. In particular an event study was constructed based on VAR(1) dynamics
and an affine term structure model in order to describe expected movements.
First, we find an indication of a decline in the interest rates on unsecured loans, at the initiation of the
Term Auction Facility. This observation is limited to loans with less than 3 months to maturity, and
is consistent with what should be expected in an efficient market. The unpredictable fall in short rates
coincides with the maturity of the loans offered in TAF.
Second, the US interbank rates showed a significantly higher propensity to fall on notification dates than
otherwise during the financial crisis. The tendency to drop was in particular strong for rates on loans
with maturity ranging 1-6 months .
Third, the LIBOR USD rates showed a tendency to decline more following TAF auctions than on other
days during the financial crisis, provided that they fell. The difference was in particular apparent on
TAF-notification dates, but was not significant.
Fourth, the TAF program impacted international interbank term structures, but this was felt in different
ways. While the GBP market reacted by on average letting long term rates drop, the EUR market
dropped short term rates. For all international markets effects were most strongly felt on the day auction
results were made available.
Fifth, the event study provided conclusive answers regarding the effect of the Term Auction Facility on
LIBOR USD term structure of interest rate spreads.
Interest rates on loans with more than 4 months to maturity rates declined more than could be explained
from the VAR-ATS model, when factors were perfectly predicted. This suggests that the results from
TAF auctions went a long way in reducing premiums on unsecured loans in the interbank marked with
longer maturities (5-12 months). The robustness of these results follows as no abnormal movements are
observed on days leading up to, or following the notification of auction-results.
Last, the TAF caused abnormal movements in time varying risk and risk premiums. These moves af-
fected the long and short term rates on both notification and settlement dates.
3.9 Comments for Further Research
Two key potentials for future research were uncovered. First, there are clear issues with performing re-
gressions on interest rate levels, and only using one or two interest rates. The results in this paper suggest
that expecting conclusive and sound answers using simple-rate-regression approaches seem unrealistic.
It is often observed that while individual interest rates show no significant signs for movement, the case
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is quite different for term structure proxy (such as the slope or curvature). This thesis provides a clear
indication that when analysing the effects of monetary policy to term structures, proxies for the entire
term structure provide a better image of effects than individual maturity rates.
They are also more likely to reflect effects when individual rates do not. It is therefore a need for
developing standards in research for studying the dynamics of such proxies. One such standard is the
Diebold and Li (2006) model.
Second, there is a potential to perform event studies and obtain results regarding how these proxies are
affected by monetary policy. In regard to the last potential there is a further need to develop a theory for
what is considered normal movement for such proxies.
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Chapter 4
Appendices
4.1 Appendix 1 - Abbreviations
Abbreviation
Ar
Arl
ATS
BoE
CBOE
CDO
CET
DMFR
DTM
ECB
EONIA
EST
EURIBOR
EURIOIS
FED
CET
LIBOR
LOIS
LTRO
MR0
MOVE
NB
NIBOR
OIS
OLS
OMO
QE
REPO
SLTRO
SSE
STIBOR
TAF
TED
VAR
VIX
Description
Abnormal Rate Difference
The first matrix in an autoregressive process
Affine Term Structure
Bank of England (UK Central bank)
Chicago Board Exchange
Collateralized Debt Obligation
Central European Time
Downward Movement Frequency Ratio
Days To Maturity
European Central Bank
Euro OverNight Index Average
Eastern Standard Time (CET -6)
European Interbank Offered Rate
(EURIBOR - OIS)
Federal Reserve (US Central bank)
Central European Time (EST +6)
London Interbank Offered Rate
(LIBOR - OIS)
Long Term Refinancing Operations (monetary measure used by ECB)
Main Refinancing Operation (monetary measure used by ECB)
Merrill Option Volatility Estimate Indexes
Norges Bank (The Norwegian Central Bank)
Norwegian Interbank Offered Rate
Overnight Indexed Swap
Ordinary Least Squares (Statistic estimation method)
Open Market Operation (monetary measure used by BoE)
Quantitative Easing (monetary measure used by FED and BoE)
Repurchase Agreement
Supplementary Long Term Refinancing Operations (monetary measure used by ECB)
Sum of Squared Errors
Stockholm Interbank Offered Rate
Term Auction Facility (monetary measure used by FED)
Acronym for T-Bill and ED (ticker for Eurodollar future contracts)
Vector AutoRegression
Volatility index by CBOE
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4.2 Appendix 2 - Test 1







Days 1 7 14 31 61 91 121 151 181 211 241 272 302 333 365
Drops 0.42 0.42 0.41 0.41 0.42 0.45 0.48 0.50 0.51 0.51 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.50 0.50
C Drops 0.47 0.51 0.49 0.59 0.61 0.63 0.68 0.73 0.73 0.71 0.68 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.64


1.14 1.22 1.20 1.43 1.44 1.39 1.42 1.46 1.44 1.41 1.35 1.24 1.25 1.25 1.28
6L (1%) 0.83 0.89 0.89 1.04 1.07 1.04 1.09 1.11 1.11 1.09 1.03 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.98
åL(5%) 0.92 0.98 0.95 1.15 1.14 1.14 1.16 1.21 1.17 1.15 1.12 1.01 1.04 1.04 1.07
år, (10%) 0.95 1.02 1.02 1.19 1.22 1.17 1.23 1.24 1.24 1.21 1.16 1.07 1.07 1.07 1.10
Table 4.1: Empirical results of LIBOR USD rates drop frequencies on TAF notification dates (DMFR).
Drops is the frequency of drops in the total sample, C Drops the frequency of drops on notification dates,
and 9 the test statistic described in expression 1. 6L(x) is the x lower confidence level of 0, where the 0
rejects Ho at a x confidence level whenever SL(x) > 1 (Marked white).
Days 7 15 21 30 60 90 120 150 180 210 240 300 330 360
Drop 0.48 0.46 0.49 0.49 0.51 0.52 0.52 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.54 0.55 0.54 0.55
C Drop 0.54 0.53 0.54 0.54 0.63 0.63 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.58 0.63 0.68 0.64 0.73


1.13 1.13 1.11 1.12 1.24 1.21 1.05 1.03 1.02 1.08 1.16 1.24 1.19 1.33
6/, (1%) 0.74 0.76 0.74 0.88 0.96 0.91 1.01 0.83 0.91 0.93 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.94
6L(5%) 0.81 0.83 0.79 0.95 1.01 0.98 1.09 0.88 0.98 1.01 1.03 1.06 1.03 1.01
åL (10%) 0.83 0.86 0.83 0.98 1.07 1.01 1.12 0.93 1.01 1.04 1.09 1.09 1.09 1.04
Table 4.2: Empirical results of EURIBOR rate drop frequencies on TAF nottfication dates. Drops is the
frequency of drops in the total sample, C Drops the frequency of drops on notification dates, and 0 the
test statistic described in expression 1. (51,(x) is the x lower confidence level of 0, where the 9 rejects Ho
at a x confidence level whenever L(x) > 1 (Marked white).



Days 1 7 14 30 60 91 181 271 365
Drops 0.50 0.44 0.40 0.41 0.40 0.41 0.4 I 0.41 0.43
C Drops 0.54 0.47 0.41 0.51 0.47 0.37 0.44 0.42 0.37


1.08 1.08 1.02 1.23 1.18 0.92 1.08 1.04 0.88
5L(1%) 0.83 0.81 0.74 0.89 0.86 0.68 0.80 0.77 0.64
6L(5%) 0.90 0.86 0.81 0.98 0.92 0.72 0.85 0.82 0.70
(51,(10%) 0.93 0.92 0.84 1.02 0.98 0.77 0.91 0.88 0.75
Table 4.3: Empirical results of NIBOR rate drop frequencies on TAF notification dates. Drops is the
frequency of drops in the total sample, C Drops the frequency of drops on nonfication dates, and 0 the
test statistic described in expression 1. c5L(x) is the x lower confidence level of 0, where the 0 rejects Ho
at a x confidence level whenever SL(x) > 1 (Marked white).
Days 1 7 14 30 60 91 181 271 365
Drops 0.50 0.44 0.40 0.41 0.40 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.43
C Drops 0.53 0.58 0.53 0.49 0.32 0.39 0.36 0.42 0.49


1.05 1.31 1.32 1.18 0.80 0.96 0.87 1.04 1.16
ÖL(1%) 0.80 0.98 0.95 0.86 0.58 0.71 0.65 0.77 0.84
8L (5%) 0.87 1.04 1.05 0.95 0.62 0.75 0.69 0.82 0.92
6/, (10%) 0.90 1.11 1.09 0.98 0.67 0.81 0.74 0.88 0.98
Table 4.4: Empirical results of LIBOR GBP interest rate drop frequencies on TAF notification dates.
Drops is the frequency of drops in the total sample, C Drops the frequency of drops on notification dates,
and 0 the test statistic described in expression 1. ö(x) is the x lower confidence level of 0, where the 0
rejects Ho at a x confidence level whenever 8L(x) > 1 (Marked white).
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61,(1%) 6U(1%) 6L(5%) 6U(5%)
Auction Dates 0.97 1.08 0.98 1.07
Notification Dates 0.99 1.10 1.00 1.08
Settlement Date 0.97 1.08 0.98 1.06
6L(10%)
0.99
1.01
0.99
6U(10%) 0
1.06 1.02
1.08 1.04
1.06 1.02
Table 4.5: DMFRfor the LIBOR USD TermStructure Slope
Auction Dates
Notification Dates
Settlement Date
6L(1%) SU(1%)
1.05 1.17
1.04 1.15
0.91 1.01
6L(5%) 6U(5%) 6L(10%)
	
1.07 1.16 1.07
	
1.05 1.14 1.06
	
0.92 1.00 0.93
6U(10%) 0
1.15 1.11
1.13 1.09
0.99 0.96
Table 4.6: DMFRfor the LIBOR USD TermStructure Curvature
Auction Dates
6L(1%) 6U(1%)
1.09 1.21
1.16
1.06 1.18
6L(1%) 6U(1%)
0.86 0.96
6L(5%) 6U(5%)
	
1.10 1.19
	
1.05 1.14
	
1.07 1.16
6L(5%) 6U(5%)
	
0.87 0.95
	
1.23 1.33
	
0.86 0.94
6L(10%)
1.11
1.06
1.08
61,(10%)
0.88
1.24
0.87
6U(10%) 0
0.94 0.91
1.32 1.28
0.93 0.90
1.15
1.10
1.12
Auction Dates
Notification Dates 1.04
Settlement Date
Notification Dates 1.22 1.35
Settlement Date 0.85 0.95
Table 4.7: DMFRfor the EURIBOR TermStructure Slope
Table 4.8: DMFRfor the EURIBOR TermStructure Curvature
Auction Dates
NotificationDates
Settlement Date
6L(1%) 6U(1%)
	
0.86 0.96
	
0.94 1.05
	
1.03 1.15
6L(5%)
0.87
0.96
1.04
6U(5%) 61,(10%)
	
0.95 0.88
	
1.04 0.96
	
1.14 1.05
6U(10%) 0
0.94 0.91
1.03 1.00
1.13 1.09
Table 4.9: DMFRfor the LIBOR GBP TermStructure Slope
Auction Dates
NotificationDates
Settlement Date
6L(1%) 6U(1%)
1.12 1.26
1.11 1.24
0.89 1.00
6L(5%) 6U(5%) 6L(10%)
	
1.14 1.24 1.15
	
1.12 1.22 1.13
	
0.91 0.99 0.91
6U(10%) 0
1.23 1.19
1.21 1.17
0.98 0.95
Table 4.10: DMFRfor the LIBOR GBP TermStructure Curvature
Auction Dates
NotificationDates
Settlement Date
6L(1%) 6U(1%) 61,(5%) 6U(5%) 6L(10%) 6U(10%) 0
0.98 1.10 1.00 1.08 1.00 1.08 1.04
1.07 1.20 1.08 1.18 1.09 1.17 1.13
0.81 0.90 0.82 0.89 0.82 0.89 0.85
Table 4.11: DMFRfor the NIBOR TermStructure Slope
6L(1%) 6U(1%) 61,(5%) 6U(5%) 6L(10%) (10%) 0
AuctionDates 0.83 0.94 0.85 0.93 0.85 0.92 0.89
NotificationDates 0.92 1.04 0.93 1.02 0.94 1.01 0.98
Settlement Date 1.16 1.30 1.17 1.28 1.18 1.27 1.22
Table 4.12: DMFRfor the NIBOR TermStructure Curvature
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Auction Dates
Notification Dates
Settlement Date
61,(1%) 6U(1%)
	
1.13 1.28
	
1.01 1.14
	
0.91 1.03
61,(5%) 6U(5%) 61(10%) 6U(10%) 0
1.15 1.26 1.15 1.25 1.20
1.02 1.12 1.03 1.11 1.07
0.92 1.01 0.93 1.00 0.96
Table 4.13: DMFR for the LOIS USD Term Structure Slope
61,(1%) 6U(1%) 6L(5%) 6U(5%) 61(10%) 6U(10%) 0
Auction Dates 1.23 1.39 1.24 1.37 1.25 1.36 1.30
Notification Dates 0.97 1.09 0.98 1.08 0.99 1.07 1.03
Settlement Date 0.90 1.02 0.91 1.00 0.92 0.99 0.95
Table 4.14: DMFR for the LOIS USD Term Structure Curvature
Auction Dates
Notification Dates
Settlement Date
6L(1%)
0.84
0.90
0.96
6U(1%) 61(5%)
	
0.95 0.85
	
1.01 0.91
	
1.09 0.98
6U(5%) 61(10%) 6U(10%) 0
0.93 0.85 0.92 0.89
1.00 0.91 0.99 0.95
1.07 0.98 1.06 1.02
Table 4.15: DMFR for the EURIOIS Term Structure Slope
6L(1%) 6U(1%) 61,(5%) 6U(5%) 61(10%) 6U(10%) 0
Auction Dates 0.87 0.99 0.88 0.97 0.89 0.97 0.93
Notification Dates 0.94 1.06 0.95 1.04 0.96 1.04 0.99
Settlement Date 0.83 0.94 0.84 0.93 0.85 0.92 0.88
Table 4.16: DMFR for the EURIOIS Term Structure Curvature
Auction Dates
Notification Dates
Settlement Date
61(1%) 6U(1%)
	
0.64 0.72
	
1.02 1.16
	
1.16 1.32
6L(5%)
0.65
1.04
1.18
6U(5%) 61,(10%) 6U(10%) 0
0.71 0.65 0.71 0.68
1.14 1.05 1.13 1.09
1.30 1.19 1.29 1.24
Table 4.17: DMFR for the LOIS GBP Term Structure Slope
6L(1%) 6U(1%) 61(5%) 6U(5%) 61(10%) 6U(10%) 0
Auction Dates 1.03 1.17 1.04 1.15 1.05 1.14 1.09
Notification Dates 0.86 0.97 0.87 0.96 0.88 0.95 0.91
Settlement Date 0.68 0.77 0.69 0.75 0.69 0.75 0.72
Table 4.18: DMFR for the LOIS GBP Term Structure Curvature
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61,(1%) 8U(1%) 6L(5%) 6U(5%) SL(10%) 6U(10%)


1 M 0.9996 1.2444 1.0265 1.2050 1.0370 1.1909 1.1086
2 M 0.9834 1.2146 1.0062 1.1863 1.0196 1.1681 1.0888
3 M 1.0027 1.2404 1.0256 1.2071 1.0392 1.1888 1.1090
4 M 1.0615 1.3005 1.0817 1.2667 1.0956 1.2481 1.1669
5 M 1.0582 1.3005 1.0817 1.2667 1.0956 1.2481 1.1669
6 M 1.1007 1.3320 1.1208 1.2991 1.1347 1.2854 1.2054
7 M 0.9963 1.2181 1.0183 1.1911 1.0313 1.1738 1.0980
8 M 1.0084 1.2333 1.0303 1.1977 1.0433 1.1849 1.1096
9 M 1.1880 1.4654 1.2148 1.4265 1.2307 1.4052 1.3122
10 M 1.0886 1.3415 1.1099 1.3055 1.1245 1.2858 1.1998
11 M 1.0313 1.2759 1.0549 1.2415 1.0689 1.2227 1.1406
12 M 1.1496 1.4233 1.1760 1.3795 1.1916 1.3586 1.2719
Table 4.19: The DMFR for the LOIS spread on Auction Dates for the TAF program.


81,(1%) SU(1%) 81,(5%) 6U(5%) ÖL(10%) SU(10%)


1 M 1.0036 1.2494 1.0272 1.2147 1.0412 1.1957 1.1131
2 M 0.9606 1.1873 0.9796 1.1550 0.9927 1.1373 1.0601
3 M 0.9187 1.1366 0.9397 1.1017 0.9522 1.0892 1.0161
4 M 0.8930 1.0934 0.9158 1.0650 0.9246 1.0533 0.9848
5 M 0.8958 1.0975 0.9158 1.0690 0.9246 1.0533 0.9848
6 M 0.8887 1.0794 0.9077 1.0526 0.9161 1.0379 0.9732
7 M 0.8615 1.0541 0.8778 1.0268 0.8891 1.0119 0.9465
8 M 0.8458 1.0345 0.8642 1.0082 0.8751 0.9938 0.9307
9 M 0.8486 1.0467 0.8677 1.0189 0.8791 1.0037 0.9373
10 M 0.9483 1.1732 0.9700 1.1373 0.9796 1.1201 1.0452
11 M 0.9453 1.1732 0.9700 1.1416 0.9829 1.1243 1.0489
12 M 0.9216 1.1456 0.9428 1.1102 0.9553 1.0934 1.0197
Table 4.20: The DMFR for the LOIS spread on Noufication Dates for the TAF program.
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6L(1%) 6U(1%) 61,(5%) 6U(5%) 5L(10%) 6U (10%) 0
1 M 0.7560 0.9373 0.7737 0.9150 0.7843 0.9007 0.8384
2 M 0.9297 1.1483 0.9512 1.1215 0.9639 1.1043 1.0293
3 M 0.9822 1.2151 1.0047 1.1824 1.0180 1.1645 1.0863
4 M 0.9577 1.1689 0.9760 1.1386 0.9885 1.1261 1.0528
5 M 1.0176 1.2467 1.0403 1.2098 1.0503 1.1965 1.1186
6 M 0.8629 1.0481 0.8787 1.0184 0.8896 1.0077 0.9450
7 M 0.8006 0.9863 0.8183 0.9572 0.8287 0.9432 0.8823
8 M 0.7908 0.9643 0.8056 0.9398 0.8157 0.9264 0.8675
9 M 0.9092 1.1171 0.9297 1.0917 0.9419 1.0754 1.0042
10 M 0.7343 0.9078 0.7510 0.8834 0.7610 0.8701 0.8119
11 M 0.7390 0.9113 0.7560 0.8868 0.7635 0.8734 0.8147
12 M 0.7390 0.9150 0.7560 0.8868 0.7660 0.8767 0.8176
Table 4.21: The DMFR for the LOIS spread on Settlement Dates for the TAF program.


6L(1%) 6U(1%) 61,(5%) 6U(5%) 6L(10%) 6U(10%)


Auction Date 0.9975 1.1328 1.0148 1.1139 1.0226 1.1060 1.0621
Notification Date 0.9341 1.0572 0.9482 1.0408 0.9544 1.0322 0.9924
Settlement Date 0.7248 0.8212 0.7358 0.8094 0.7414 0.8037 0.7709
Table4.22: The DMFR for the LOIS spread slope.


6L(1%) 6U(1%) 61,(5%) 6U(5%) 6L(10%) 6U(10%)


Auction Dates 0.79 0.88 0.80 0.87 0.81 0.86 0.83
Notification Dates 1.01 1.13 1.03 1.12 1.03 1.11 1.07
Settlement Date 0.85 0.95 0.86 0.93 0.86 0.93 0.89
Table 4.23: The DMFR for the LOIS Curvature on dates for the TAF program.
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4.3 Appendix 3 - Test 2




Days 61(5%) 81u(5%) 8L(5%) Su(5%) 01 02
1 -0.289 -0.049 -0.073 -0.029 -0.133 -0.049
7 -0.102 -0.028 -0.039 -0.007 -0.060 -0.019
14 -0.096 -0.029 -0.040 -0.008 -0.058 -0.021
31 -0.070 -0.022 -0.042 -0.007 -0.043 -0.022
61 -0.061 -0.020 -0.044 -0.008 -0.038 -0.023
91 -0.058 -0.017 -0.050 -0.011 -0.034 -0.027
121 -0.059 -0.020 -0.048 -0.013 -0.037 -0.028
151 -0.056 -0.021 -0.044 -0.015 -0.036 -0.028
181 -0.058 -0.022 -0.048 -0.019 -0.038 -0.032
211 -0.060 -0.025 -0.050 -0.021 -0.040 -0.034
241 -0.061 -0.026 -0.052 -0.023 -0.041 -0.036
272 -0.062 -0.028 -0.053 -0.024 -0.043 -0.037
302 -0.062 -0.028 -0.051 -0.024 -0.043 -0.037
333 -0.063 -0.030 -0.051 -0.024 -0.045 -0.037
365 -0.066 -0.032 -0.052 -0.025 -0.047 -0.038
Table 4.24: Summary of Expected Drop Size Result for the LIBOR USD Term Structure. Empirical
confidence intervals for the unconditionally expected drop size 41, (61L(5%),k(5%)) compared with
the confidence interval for the conditional expected drop size 02, (61,(5%),8b(5%)). (Significantly
different expected dropsizes marked in white). Values Measured in Percentage Points.
Days SL(5%) Su(5%) 6L(5%) 6u(5%) 01 02
7 -0.067 -0.029 -0.041 -0.010 -0.046 -0.024
15 -0.068 -0.025 -0.041 -0.011 -0.043 -0.024
21 -0.059 -0.023 -0.034 -0.011 -0.038 -0.021
30 -0.051 -0.023 -0.029 -0.012 -0.035 -0.020
60 -0.047 -0.023 -0.024 -0.011 -0.034 -0.017
90 -0.041 -0.021 -0.024 -0.011 -0.030 -0.017
120 -0.042 -0.021 -0.027 -0.012 -0.030 -0.019
150 -0.040 -0.021 -0.026 -0.011 -0.030 -0.018
180 -0.042 -0.021 -0.028 -0.012 -0.030 -0.019
210 -0.041 -0.021 -0.026 -0.011 -0.030 -0.018
240 -0.041 -0.021 -0.026 -0.011 -0.030 -0.018
300 -0.042 -0.022 -0.025 -0.010 -0.030 -0.017
330 -0.041 -0.022 -0.024 -0.010 -0.030 -0.017
360 -0.040 -0.021 -0.026 -0.011 -0.029 -0.018
Table 4.25: Sunnnary of Expected Drop Size Result for the EURIBOR Term Structure. Empirical con-
fidence intervals for the unconditionally expected drop size Oi, (63,(5%), S(5%)) compared with the
confidence interval for the conditional expected drop size 02, (.511,(5%), (5,(5%)). (Significantly different
expected dropsizes marked in white). Values Measured in Percentage Points.
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Days 61,(5%) u (5%) L(5%) 6u (5%) 01 02
1 -0.207 -0.042 -0.031 -0.007 -0.102 -0.017
7 -0.124 -0.031 -0.050 -0.012 -0.067 -0.029
14 -0.083 -0.026 -0.040 -0.013 -0.047 -0.025
31 -0.076 -0.018 -0.032 -0.013 -0.035 -0.022
61 -0.072 -0.017 -0.027 -0.012 -0.033 -0.019
91 -0.060 -0.016 -0.028 -0.013 -0.029 -0.020
121 -0.063 -0.016 -0.026 -0.013 -0.030 -0.019
181 -0.062 -0.016 -0.028 -0.015 -0.030 -0.021
211 -0.062 -0.017 -0.026 -0.014 -0.029 -0.019
241 -0.059 -0.017 -0.026 -0.014 -0.029 -0.019
271 -0.064 -0.019 -0.027 -0.015 -0.032 -0.020
301 -0.058 -0.017 -0.026 -0.015 -0.029 -0.020
331 -0.061 -0.017 -0.026 -0.015 -0.030 -0.020
365 -0.069 -0.018 -0.027 -0.015 -0.031 -0.021
Table 4.26: Summary of Expected Drop Size Result for the LIBOR Sterling Term Structure. Empirical
confidence intervals for the unconditionally expected drop size 41, (S1L(5%), 6(5%)) compared with the
confidence interval for the conditional expected drop size 02, (81,(5%) 5 (5%)). (Significantly different
expected dropsizes marked in white). Values Measured in Percentage Points.
Days (SL(5%) 6u (5%) L(5%) Su(5%) 01 02
1 -0.219 -0.100 -0.183 -0.096 -0.151 -0.136
7 -0.211 -0.086 -0.138 -0.060 -0.139 -0.097
14 -0.216 -0.078 -0.115 -0.040 -0.135 -0.072
30 -0.239 -0.081 -0.126 -0.033 -0.146 -0.075
60 -0.183 -0.085 -0.134 -0.043 -0.129 -0.083
91 -0.164 -0.072 -0.122 -0.046 -0.114 -0.081
181 -0.192 -0.071 -0.097 -0.039 -0.126 -0.064
271 -0.156 -0.065 -0.079 -0.036 -0.106 -0.055
365 -0.130 -0.058 -0.063 -0.030 -0.090 -0.045
Table4.27: Summary of Expected Drop Size Result for the NIBOR Term Structure. Empirical confidence
intervals for the unconditionally expected drop size Oi, (6.1L(5%), k(5%)) compared with the confidence
interval for the conditional expected drop size 02, (61,(5%), åb (5%)). (Significantly different expected
dropsizes marked in white). Values Measured in Percentage Points.
55
1 Month 6L(1%) 6U(1%) 6L(5%) SU(5%) 61,(10%) 6U(10%) 0
TAF Auction -0.054 -0.015 -0.048 -0.019 -0.046 -0.021 -0.033
TAF Notification -0.059 -0.008 -0.051 -0.011 -0.047 -0.013 -0.029
TAF Settlement -0.054 -0.008 -0.047 -0.011 -0.043 -0.012 -0.026
Otherwise -0.025 -0.014 -0.023 -0.015 -0.022 -0.015 -0.018
3 Months 6L(1%) SU(1%) 61,(5%) 6U(5%) 6L(10%) 6U(10%) 0
TAF Auction -0.050 -0.014 -0.045 -0.017 -0.043 -0.019 -0.030
TAF Notification -0.061 -0.010 -0.052 -0.012 -0.048 -0.014 -0.029
TAF Settlement -0.029 -0.009 -0.026 -0.010 -0.025 -0.011 -0.018
Otherwise -0.021 -0.014 -0.020 -0.015 -0.019 -0.015 -0.017
6 Months 6L(1%) 6U(1%) 61,(5%) 6U(5%) 6L(10%) 6U(10%) 0
TAF Auction -0.044 -0.019 -0.040 -0.021 -0.038 -0.022 -0.030
TAF Notification -0.055 -0.016 -0.049 -0.019 -0.046 -0.020 -0.032
TAF Settlement -0.027 -0.012 -0.025 -0.014 -0.024 -0.014 -0.019
Otherwise -0.026 -0.020 -0.025 -0.021 -0.025 -0.021 -0.023
12 Months 6L(1%) 6U(1%) 6L(5%) 6U(5%) 6L(10%) 6U(10%) 0
TAF Auction -0.052 -0.024 -0.048 -0.027 -0.046 -0.028 -0.037
TAF Notification -0.062 -0.024 -0.056 -0.027 -0.053 -0.029 -0.041
TAF Settlement -0.051 -0.027 -0.048 -0.030 -0.046 -0.031 -0.038
Otherwise -0.038 -0.030 -0.037 -0.031 -0.036 -0.031 -0.034
Table 4.28: Expected Drop Size for 1 month, 3 months 6 months and 12 months LOIS USD spread.
Hypothesis of equality in movement sizes rejected at indicated significance level marked grey.


6L(1%) 6U(1%) 6L(5%) 6U(5%) 6L(10%) 6U(10%) 0
TAF Auction -0.034 -0.016 -0.031 -0.018 -0.030 -0.018 -0.024
TAF Notification -0.062 -0.026 -0.056 -0.029 -0.053 -0.030 -0.040
TAF Settlement -0.071 -0.027 -0.063 -0.030 -0.060 -0.031 -0.044
Otherwise -0.037 -0.029 -0.036 -0.030 -0.036 -0.030 -0.033
Table 4.29: Expected Drop Size LOIS USD spread slope. Hypothesis of equality in movement sizes
rejected at indicated significance level marked grey.


6L(1%) 6U(1%) 61,(5%) 6U(5%) 6L(10%) 6U(10%) 0
TAF Auction -0.034 -0.016 -0.031 -0.018 -0.030 -0.019 -0.024
TAF Notification -0.056 -0.023 -0.052 -0.026 -0.049 -0.028 -0.038
TAF Settlement -0.054 -0.024 -0.049 -0.026 -0.047 -0.028 -0.037
Otherwise -0.030 -0.021 -0.029 -0.021 -0.028 -0.022 -0.024
Table 4.30: Expected Drop Size LOIS USD spread Curvature. Hypothesis of equality in movement sizes
rejected at indicated significance level marked grey.
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1 Month 6L(1%) 6U(1%) 61)(5%) 6U(5%) 61,(10%) 6U(10%)


TAFAuction -0.043 -0.011 -0.037 -0.013 -0.035 -0.014 -0.023
TAF Notification -0.025 -0.008 -0.023 -0.009 -0.021 -0.010 -0.015
TAF Settlement -0.044 -0.015 -0.040 -0.017 -0.038 -0.018 -0.027
Otherwise -0.015 -0.012 -0.015 -0.012 -0.015 -0.012 -0.013
3 Months 6L(1%) 6U(1%) 6L(5%) 6U(5%) 6L(10%) 6U(10%)


TAF Auction -0.025 -0.012 -0.023 -0.013 -0.022 -0.014 -0.018
TAF Notification -0.026 -0.010 -0.024 -0.012 -0.023 -0.013 -0.017
TAF Settlement -0.035 -0.013 -0.032 -0.015 -0.030 -0.016 -0.023
Otherwise -0.015 -0.012 -0.015 -0.012 -0.014 -0.012 -0.013
6 Months 61,(1%) 6U(1%) 6L(5%) 6U(5%) 61,(10%) 6U(10%)


TAF Auction -0.031 -0.015 -0.029 -0.017 -0.028 -0.018 -0.023
TAFNotification -0.027 -0.012 -0.025 -0.013 -0.024 -0.014 -0.018
TAF Settlement -0.036 -0.014 -0.033 -0.016 -0.032 -0.018 -0.024
Otherwise -0.018 -0.014 -0.018 -0.015 -0.017 -0.015 -0.016
12 Months 6L(1%) 6U(1%) 6L(5%) 6U(5%) 6L(10%) 6U(10%)


TAF Auction -0.044 -0.023 -0.041 -0.025 -0.040 -0.026 -0.033
TAF Notification -0.034 -0.018 -0.032 -0.019 -0.031 -0.020 -0.025
TAF Settlement -0.044 -0.017 -0.041 -0.020 -0.039 -0.021 -0.030
Otherwise -0.028 -0.023 -0.027 -0.024 -0.027 -0.024 -0.025
Table 4.31: Expected Drop Size for 1 month, 3 tnonths 6 months and 12 months EURIOIS spread.
Hypothesis of equality in movement sizes rejected at indicated significance level marked grey.


6L(1%) 8U(1%) 6L(5%) 6U(5%) SL(10%) 6U(10%)


TAF Auction -0.045 -0.022 -0.042 -0.024 -0.040 -0.025 -0.032
TAFNotification -0.054 -0.019 -0.048 -0.021 -0.045 -0.022 -0.032
TAF Settlement -0.048 -0.017 -0.042 -0.019 -0.040 -0.021 -0.029
Otherwise -0.029 -0.023 -0.028 -0.024 -0.028 -0.024 -0.026
Table 4.32: Expected Drop Size EURIOIS spread slope. Hypothesis of equality in movement sizes re-
jected at indicated significance level marked grey.


6L(1%) 6U(1%) 6L(5%) 6U(5%) 6L(10%) 6U(10%) 0
TAF Auction -0.058 -0.016 -0.050 -0.018 -0.047 -0.020 -0.032
TAF Notification -0.024 -0.012 -0.023 -0.013 -0.022 -0.014 -0.018
TAF Settlement -0.035 -0.016 -0.032 -0.017 -0.030 -0.018 -0.024
Otherwise -0.020 -0.016 -0.019 -0.017 -0.019 -0.017 -0.018
Table 4.33: Expected Drop Size EURIOIS spread Curvature. Hypothesis of equality in movement sizes
rejected at indicated significance level marked grey.
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1 Month 8L(1%) 6U(1%) SL (5%) SU (5%) SL(10%) 6U(10%)


TAF Auction -0.019 -0.005 -0.017 -0.006 -0.016 -0.007 -0.011
TAF Notification -0.034 -0.009 -0.030 -0.010 -0.028 -0.012 -0.019
TAF Settlement -0.161 -0.009 -0.129 -0.011 -0.116 -0.012 -0.055
Otherwise -0.021 -0.019 -0.021 -0.019 -0.021 -0.019 -0.020
3 Months 6L(1%) 6U(1%) 6L(5%) 6U (5%) 6L(10%) 6U(10%)


TAF Auction -0.021 -0.008 -0.019 -0.009 -0.018 -0.010 -0.014
TAF Notification -0.030 -0.010 -0.027 -0.012 -0.025 -0.013 -0.018
TAF Settlement -0.160 -0.011 -0.129 -0.013 -0.115 -0.014 -0.056
Otherwise -0.019 -0.011 -0.018 -0.012 -0.017 -0.012 -0.014
6 Months 6L(1%) 6U (1%) 6L(5%) 611(5%) 6L(10%) SU(10%) 0
TAF Auction -0.027 -0.011 -0.025 -0.013 -0.024 -0.014 -0.018
TAF Notification -0.032 -0.014 -0.030 -0.016 -0.028 -0.017 -0.022
TAF Settlement -0.181 -0.016 -0.144 -0.019 -0.132 -0.021 -0.066
Otherwise -0.024 -0.017 -0.023 -0.017 -0.022 -0.018 -0.020
12 Months 6L(1%) 6U(1%) 6L(5%) SU (5%) 61,(10%) SU(10%) 0
TAF Auction -0.039 -0.018 -0.036 -0.020 -0.035 -0.021 -0.027
TAF Notification -0.044 -0.020 -0.040 -0.022 -0.039 -0.023 -0.031
TAF Settlement -0.227 -0.023 -0.183 -0.029 -0.165 -0.032 -0.087
Otherwise -0.031 -0.023 -0.030 -0.023 -0.029 -0.024 -0.026
Table 4.34: Expected Drop Size for 1 month, 3 months 6 months and 12 months LOIS GBP spread.
Hypothesis of equality in movement sizes rejected at indicated significance level marked grey.


6L(1%) 6U (1%) 6L(5%) (5%) 6L(10%) SU(10%)


TAF Auction -0.053 -0.014 -0.046 -0.016 -0.043 -0.018 -0.029
TAF Notification -0.046 -0.014 -0.041 -0.016 -0.039 -0.018 -0.028
TAF Settlement -0.056 -0.019 -0.051 -0.022 -0.049 -0.024 -0.036
Otherwise -0.019 -0.015 -0.018 -0.016 -0.018 -0.016 -0.017
Table 4.35: Expected Drop Size LOIS GBP spread slope. Hypothesis of equality in movement sizes
rejected at indicated significance level marked grey.


6L(1%) 6U(1%) 6L(5%) SU (5%) SL(10%) 6U(10%)


TAF Auction -0.039 -0.017 -0.036 -0.019 -0.035 -0.021 -0.027
TAF Notification -0.040 -0.017 -0.037 -0.019 -0.035 -0.020 -0.028
TAF Settlement -0.066 -0.017 -0.058 -0.021 -0.054 -0.023 -0.037
Otherwise -0.029 -0.023 -0.028 -0.024 -0.028 -0.024 -0.026
Table 4.36: Expected Drop Size LOIS GBP spread Curvature. Hypothesis of equality in movement sizes
rejected at indicated siginficance level marked grey.
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4.4 Appendix 4 - TAF Auction Data
Press release date Auction date Notification date Settement date Term
(days)
Amount
offered (bn)
Proportion
accepted (bn)
# bidders Proportion
submitted (bn)
14.12.2007 17.12.2007 19.12.2007 20.12.2007 28 20 20.000 93 61.553
19.12.2007 20.12.2007 12.12.2007 27.12.2007 35 20 20.000 73 57.664
11.01.2008 14.01.2008 15.01.2008 17.01.2008 28 30 30.000 56 55.526
25.01.2008 28.01.2008 29.01.2008 31.01.2008 28 30 30.000 52 37.452
08.02.2008 11.02.2008 12.02.2008 14.08.2008 28 30 30.000 66 58.400
22.02.2008 25.02.2008 26.02.2008 28.02.2008 28 30 30.000 72 67.958
10.03.2008 10.03.2008 11.03.2008 13.03.2008 28 50 50.000 82 92.592
24.03.2008 24.03.2008 25.03.2008 27.03.2008 28 50 50.000 88 88.869
07.04.2008 07.04.2008 08.04.2008 10.04.2008 28 50 50.000 79 91.569
21.04.2008 21.04.2008 22.04.2008 24.04.2008 28 50 50.000 83 88.288
05.05.2008 05.05.2008 06.04.2008 08.04.2008 28 75 75.000 71 96.618
19.05.2008 19.05.2008 22.04.2008 24.04.2008 28 75 75.000 75 84.438
02.06.2008 02.06.2008 03.06.2008 05.06.2008 28 75 75.000 73 95.914
16.06.2008 16.06.2008 17.06.2008 19.06.2008 28 75 75.000 76 89.377
30.06.2008 30.06.2008 01.07.2008 03.07.2008 28 75 75.000 77 90.881
14.07.2008 14.07.2008 15.07.2008 17.07.2008 28 75 75.000 82 93.344
28.07.2008 28.07.2008 29.07.2008 31.07.2008 28 75 75.000 70 90.555
11.08.2008 11.08.2008 12.08.2008 14.08.2008 84 25 25.000 64 54.800
12.08.2008 12.08.2008 13.08.2008 14.08.2008 28 50 50.000 65 75.462
25.08.2008 25.08.2008 26.08.2008 28.08.2008 28 75 75.000 66 84.168
08.09.2008 08.09.2008 09.09.2008 11.09.2008 84 25 25.000 38 31.638
09.09.2008 09.09.2008 10.09.2008 11.09.2008 28 25 25.000 53 46.237
22.09.2008 22.09.2008 23.09.2008 25.09.2008 28 75 75.000 85 113.562
06.10.2008 06.10.2008 07.10.2008 09.10.2008 85 150 138.092 71 138.092
10.11.2008 10.11.2008 12.11.2008 22.11.2008 17 150 12.629 16 12.629
Table 4.37: Continues on the next page...
TermAuction Facility (TAF) datafrom December 2007 untill March 2010 - source FED.
Press release date Auction date Notification date Settement date Term
(days)
Amount
offered (bn)
Proportion
accepted (bn)
# bidders Proportion
submitted (bn)
17.11.2008 17.11.2008 18.11.2008 20.11.2008 28 150 104.478 80 104.478
24.11.2008 24.11.2008 25.11.2008 26.11.2008 13 150 31.075 16 31.075
01.12.2008 01.12.2008 02.12.2008 04.12.2008 84 150 66.471 80 66.471
15.12.2008 15.12.2008 15.12.2008 15.12.2008 28 150 63.014 71 63.014
29.12.2008 29.12.2008 30.12.2008 02.01.2009 83 150 102.979 72 102.979
12.01.2009 12.01.2009 13.01.2009 15.01.2009 28 150 107.747 97 107.747
26.01.2009 26.01.2009 27.01.2009 29.01.2009 84 150 136.051 102 136.051
09.02.2009 09.02.2009 10.02.2009 12.02.2009 28 150 142.448 117 142.448
23.02.2009 23.02.2009 24.02.2009 26.02.2009 84 150 111.683 96 111.683
09.03.2009 09.03.2009 10.03.2009 12.03.2009 28 150 117.872 116 117.872
23.03.2009 23.03.2009 24.03.2009 26.03.2009 84 150 101.642 103 101.642
06.04.2009 06.04.2009 07.04.2009 09.04.2009 28 150 106.251 105 106.251
20.04.2009 20.04.2009 21.04.2009 23.04.2009 84 150 83.830 98 83.830
04.05.2009 04.05.2009 05.05.2009 07.05.2009 28 150 131.562 124 131.562
18.05.2009 18.05.2009 19.05.2009 21.05.2009 84 150 55.570 96 55.570
01.06.2009 01.06.2009 02.06.2009 04.06.2009 28 150 95.588 103 95.588
15.06.2009 15.06.2009 16.06.2009 18.06.2009 84 150 48.023 97 48.023
29.06.2009 29.06.2009 30.06.2009 02.07.2009 28 150 86.337 106 86.337
13.07.2009 13.07.2009 14.07.2009 16.07.2009 84 125 47.768 87 47.768
27.07.2009 27.07.2009 28.07.2009 30.07.2009 28 125 82.375 103 82.375
10.08.2009 10.08.2009 11.08.2009 13.08.2009 84 100 106.251 105 106.251
24.08.2009 24.08.2009 25.08.2009 27.08.2009 28 100 73.404 97 73.404
08.09.2009 08.09.2009 09.09.2009 10.09.2009 84 75 31.908 75 31.908
21.09.2009 21.09.2009 22.09.2009 24.09.2009 28 75 55.763 83 55.763
05.10.2009 05.10.2009 06.10.2009 08.10.2009 70 50 24.830 75 24.830
19.10.2009 19.10.2009 20.10.2009 22.10.2009 28 75 39.566 83 39.566
02.11.2009 02.11.2009 03.11.2009 05.11.2009 70 25 13.152 53 13.152
16.11.2009 16.11.2009 17.11.2009 19.11.2009 28 75 31.119 82 31.119
30.11.2009 30.11.2009 01.12.2009 03.12.2009 42 25 16.730 49 16.730
14.12.2009 14.12.2009 15.12.2009 17.12.2009 28 75 46.035 102 46.035
11.01.2010 11.01.2010 12.01.2010 14.01.2010 28 75 38.531 121 38.531
08.02.2010 08.02.2010 09.02.2010 10.02.2010 28 50 15.426 103 15.426
08.03.2010 08.03.2010 09.03.2010 11.03.2010 28 25 3.410 53 3.410
Table 4.38: Term Auction Facility (TAF) data from December 2007 untill March 2010- source FED.
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